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1. Introduction 
 
2015 is regarded as the year when corporate governance reform was introduced in 
Japan. By implementing the Stewardship Code and Corporate Governance Code, the 
Japanese government proposed corporate governance reform as a sustainable corporate 
growth strategy. Principle 2.31 of Japan’s Corporate Governance Code advocates that 
companies should take appropriate measures to address sustainability issues, including 
social and environmental matters. The supplementary principle supposes that as 
sustainability issues are the essential elements of risk management, the board should 
take appropriate actions to address these matters positively and proactively. G20/OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance also suggests that the corporate governance 
framework should encourage active co-operation between corporations and their 
stakeholders in creating wealth and jobs, and ensuring the sustainability of financially 
sound enterprises (OECD, 2015).  
In the Corporate Governance Code, transparent and fair decision-making, 
sustainable growth, and mid- to long-term corporate value are clearly stated as goals. 
However, their implementation presents a challenge. Originally, economic growth was 
seen as a result of efforts to sustain life. However, when the economy began to be 
perceived as an end rather than a means to survival, growth caused began to have 
negative impacts (Kokubu, 2017). For example, global environmental destruction and 
financial crisis are challenges for us. Thus, we need to identify practices that improve 
sustainability. Furthermore, as companies belong to society, their social responsibility 
cannot be ignored; their transparency and accountability should be encouraged. Under 
such circumstances, multinational corporations must recognize the existence of diverse 
stakeholders and assume social responsibility while pursuing profits. Terms such as 
“long-term” and “sustainability” are becoming more relevant, globally. Recent years 
have seen an increase in the importance of and awareness about corporate governance, 
which aims to protect stakeholders’ interests, while balancing companies’ economic 
efficiency with sustainability (Aras and Crowther, 2008). Corporate governance can be 
considered a mechanism to encourage ethics, fairness, responsibility, transparency, and 
                                                     
1 The second general principle stated in the Code is as follows “Companies should fully recognize 
that their sustainable growth and the creation of mid- to long-term corporate value are brought as a 
result of the provision of resources and contributions made by a range of stakeholders, including 
employees, customers, business partners, creditors, and local communities. As such, companies 
should endeavour to appropriately cooperate with these stakeholders. The board and the 
management should exercise their leadership in establishing a corporate culture where the rights and 
positions of stakeholders are respected and sound business ethics are ensured”. 
2 
 
accountability in the operations of businesses (Sarim et al., 2017). Companies need to 
implement corporate governance to monitor and supervise top managers and ensure 
sustainable behavior. Sustainability performance could be regarded as a result of the top 
managers’ commitment to sustainability management. This paper attempts to clarify the 
interrelations between corporate governance and sustainability performance. To improve 
sustainability performance, what style of corporate governance should the firms 
implement? How can companies manage the issues and address the dimensions of 
corporate governance and sustainability? Does corporate governance impact 
sustainability performance?  
Around the 1990s, corporate governance began to be debated on a regular basis. 
At that time, corporate governance was shareholder-oriented. Companies all over the 
world gradually began to regard shareholder-oriented corporate governance as an ideal 
mechanism. When the global financial crisis broke out in 2008, the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in the United States hit the real economy and resulted in a global recession. 
This crisis has been attributed to issues in corporate governance (Sakuma and Mizuo, 
2010). While one school of thought attributed it to a defect in risk management, another 
blamed managers’ profit-maximization incentives and short-term orientation. The 
Lehman shock has strongly emphasized the influence of modern companies on society 
and enterprise regulation. It raised the need for administrators and academics to rethink 
their traditional responsibility concepts. This financial crisis reinforced how corporate 
governance failures can ruin corporations and disrupt whole economies (Claessens and 
Yurtoglu, 2013). As the economy has been in the doldrums after the crisis, the 
discussion about corporate governance system promoting corporate growth from 
long-term orientation, particularly in the European Union (EU) countries, has been 
progressing (Sakuma and Mizuo, 2010).  
Subsequent to the Lehman shock, various organizations such as the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), UN Global Compact2, and IFC 
(World Bank Group) 3  have emerged to heighten the importance of governance 
                                                     
2 Global UN Compact proposes “companies can engage with them on three critical governance 
topics: anti-corruption, peace, and rule of law. Companies can enhance good governance by 
integrating corporate sustainability principles into their own operations and relationships, allowing 
for greater transparency accountability and inclusiveness”. (see Global UN Compact HP).  
3 International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank are building on their successful track 
record with “the aim of delivering targeted corporate governance support to more clients and 
stakeholders for even better results by assessing a firm’s corporate governance practices and 
providing advice on how to improve them; providing specialized advisory services on board 
effectiveness, the control environment, and family business governance; building capacity of local 
partners, institutes of directors, media, and educational institutions on corporate governance services, 
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structures to accommodate social objectives as part of regular corporate life (Walls et al., 
2012). More specifically, OECD (2012) analyzed the relationship between corporate 
governance and corporate growth as a central issue. The updated G20/OECD Principles 
of Corporate Governance (the Principles) provides a very timely and tangible 
contribution to the G20 priority in 2015 to support investment as a dominant driver of 
growth (OECD, 2015). The supposed main principles in OECD (2015) are ensuring the 
basis for an effective corporate governance framework; the rights and equitable 
treatment of shareholders and key ownership functions; institutional investors, stock 
markets, and other intermediaries; the role of stakeholders in corporate governance; 
disclosure and transparency; and the responsibilities of the board. Further, Kay Review4 
argues that the problem of corporate governance in the United Kingdom (the UK) was 
caused by short sightedness and the need to reform for enhancing long-term 
performance. In response to the financial crisis, there has been an international 
discussion, centered in the U.S. and UK, that focused on overcoming the short-termism 
of both companies and investors, strengthening corporate governance, enhancing 
dialogue and engagement between companies and investors, and improving corporate 
disclosure and reporting (METI, 2014). For example, the discussion on disclosure goes 
beyond purely financial metrics, such as earnings, and extends to management strategies 
and other non-financial matters that are critical to mid- and long-term corporate value 
creation (METI, 2014). “Integrated Reporting” is one example of the recent 
developments mentioned above. 
In Japan, the Abe administration5 has also positioned the reform of corporate 
governance as one of the growth strategies of Japan and implemented a series of 
policies. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) launched the Project, 
which was named as “Competitiveness and Incentives for Sustainable Growth: Building 
Favourable Relationships between Companies and Investors.” This project gathered 
managements, long-term investors, and market participants to discuss key issues, such 
                                                                                                                                                           
training and reporting; working with regulatory institutions and governments to improve corporate 
governance laws, regulations, codes, and listing requirements; raising awareness of corporate 
governance through conferences, workshops, and publication”. (see International Finance 
Corporation World Bank Group HP).  
4 In 2012, Kay Review analyzed and made recommendations with respect to “the roles of capital 
markets and investors with the aim of enhancing the long-term performance of British companies, 
which has since influenced a broader discussion within the EU”. 
5 In early 2013, “after two decades of economic stagnation, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe unveiled a 
comprehensive economic policy package to sustainably revive the Japanese economy, while 
maintaining fiscal discipline. This program came to be known as Abenomics. The centerpieces of 
Abenomics have been the three ‘policy arrows,’ aggressive monetary policy, flexible fiscal policy, 
and growth strategy including structural reform”. (The Government of Japan, HP). 
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as the globally-debated subject of capital market and corporate short-termism, dialogue 
and engagement between companies and investors, and information disclosure and 
reporting practices within a Japanese context (METI, 2014). Furthermore, the Japan 
Revitalization Strategy,6 as revised in 2015, states to prevail and promote the adoption 
of Japan’s Stewardship Code, established and released in 2014, and Corporate 
Governance Code, which entered into force in 2015, as two wheels of a cart such that 
the sustainable growth of companies are promoted by both, investors and companies, 
while cooperating with stakeholders is mainly supposed. The detailed description of this 
principle fully embodies the concern of sustainable thinking as well. In Clarke (2004), 
corporate governance is still supposed to safeguard the interests of shareholders. With 
the passage of time, the coverage of governance is extended to stakeholders (Ingley, 
2008).  
Sustainability is the other keyword derived from the above trend. Subsequent to 
the Lehman shock, companies have started recognizing the importance of corporate 
sustainability, which can support them to create new social values. For corporations, the 
corporate philosophy that governs the overall corporate behavior provides guidelines for 
long-term corporate behavior, and many emphasize coexistence with society. In this 
manner, sustainability and the movement of coexistence with society have significant 
influence on corporate behavior as well. For example, Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) adopted 17 targets to be addressed by countries including Japan at the United 
Nations Summit in September 2015 and the Paris Agreement (COP21) agreed on global 
environmental issues in December 2015. 
In such circumstances, sustainability activities extend the boundary of corporate 
governance and demand business organizations to achieve a balance among economic, 
social, and environmental goals, in addition to generating value for shareholders and 
protecting the interests of stakeholders (Sarim et al., 2017). In Japan, as symbolised by 
the fact that carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted from corporate activities increases global 
warming, stakeholders related to corporate behaviors include the current as well as the 
next generation. Such a governance mechanism that seeks sociality and public interest 
in corporate behavior is defined as “social governance” (Kokubu, 2017). In order to 
                                                     
6 The Japan Revitalization Strategy provides “three plans: the Industry Revitalization Plan, the 
Strategic Market Creation Plan, and the Strategy of Global Outreach, and establishes key 
performance indicators (KPI) for each policy measure to check the progress through the 
plan-do-check-act (PDCA) cycle. In this revised strategy, three key policy measures are set up: 
enhancing corporate governance; reforming investment of public and quasi-public funds; 
accelerating industrial restructuring and venture businesses, promoting provision of funds for 
growth”. (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, HP). 
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ensure its effectiveness, it is essential to design an appropriate institutional 
infrastructure according to each task. While discussions of corporate governance have 
shifted progressively toward environmental and social issues, and voluntary initiatives 
such as OECD Principles, Corporate Governance Code, and the UN Global Compact 
encourage firms to integrate environmental and social aspects in their governance 
agenda, the progress has shown that a company’s environmental, social, and governance 
responsibilities might be integral to its performance and long-term sustainability. It was 
not until recently that the academic community began to study the corporate 
governance—sustainability dynamic (Walls et al., 2012). As we have not yet found a 
dominant paradigm and theoretical foundation existing in the previous research, the first 
question we need to reexamine is whether there is a direct link between corporate 
governance and sustainability performance.  
On the one hand, with the development of global businesses, some companies 
have adopted a management style where subsidiaries have sufficient discretion to make 
decisions. Considering this reason, corporate governance is indispensable because it can 
support all companies to share information, grasp the management situation, and ensure 
that global strategies are adopted. On the other hand, as management control systems 
(MCSs) shape actors’ practices and support strategy, they can push organizations in the 
direction of sustainability. MCSs are central to strategy-making as they shape the 
process of strategy emergence and support the implementation of deliberate strategies 
(Gond et al., 2012). Thus, from this viewpoint, MCSs and corporate governance have 
the consistency that they all can support the implementation of strategies. In Merchant 
and Van der Stede (2012), it is also emphasized that corporate governance mechanisms 
and practices have direct and immediate effects on MCS practices and their 
effectiveness. As corporate governance adds to management control, both the concern 
for controlling the behaviors of top management, and monitoring the roles of company’s 
board of directors are apparent. Thus, this paper deals with the second research question 
to clarify the role of a management control system in the relationship between corporate 
governance and sustainability performance. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. A review of the literature is 
presented in Chapter 2, which is retracted in a systematic manner, used to diffuse an 
understanding of corporate governance and then helped to understand the original 
analytic view of monitoring intensity. Chapter 3 presents the entire analytical 
framework and research method to investigate the interrelationship of corporate 
governance–sustainability performance, and corporate governance–environmental 
management control–environmental performance. To investigate the direct impact of 
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distinct governance mechanisms of monitoring and advising, Chapter 4 employs a linear 
regression model to examine the latest 4 years’ data of Japanese companies from a 
long-term point of view. In Chapter 5, we adopt the research method of structural 
equation modeling (SEM) to clarify the mediating role of environmental management 
control on the relationship between corporate governance and environmental 
performance. Finally, the last chapter presents this study’s conclusions, contributions, 
and implications for practice. 
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2. Literature review on corporate governance and sustainability 
performance  
 
2.1 Corporate governance mechanisms and sustainability performance  
 
In this study, literature review is conducted based on the steps of systematic 
review7 introduced in Tranfield et al. (2003). One objective of the literature review is to 
provide a portrait of existing research on a given subject. Systematic reviews explore 
the body of literature using correct filtering techniques to screen, search, and evaluate 
each related study in a critical and justified manner (Vazquez-Carrasco and Lopez-Perez, 
2013). The fundamental criterion is to provide valid, applicable evidence for use in 
future research. Hence, such reviews should be methodical, precise, and reproducible in 
order to boost the knowledge base to facilitate appropriate decision-making. A 
systematic literature review can be considered as a fundamental scientific activity with 
an underlying logic rooted in various premises (Tranfield et al., 2003). 
The research subject of the literature review is an article included in the English 
database Web of Science8 and Japanese database CiNii9, which provide data, books, 
journals, and patents, among others. In this paper, we only focus on academic papers. 
The first search string is set as “sustainability management” and “corporate governance.” 
To find articles and papers in a wide range of journals, we include the synonyms for 
sustainability management established with the help of the primary literature and 
reviews, and include “sustainability,” and “corporate social responsibility.” Articles are 
selected by title, keywords, empirical or interview, and abstract search from 2001 to 
2015.  
Overall, 38 articles take the sustainability aspect into consideration, including 
qualitative researches. Moreover, 13 articles are published in the Journal of Business 
                                                     
7 According to Tranfield et al. (2003), systematic literature review consists of “five methodological 
steps, including: (1) identification of keywords and creation of search strings based on the identified 
keywords; (2) selection of studies through relevant research databases; (3) analysis of identified 
papers based on inclusion and exclusion criteria; (4) data extraction into a reference management 
database; and (5) data synthesis and reporting”. 
8 The database “Web of Science” was established by Thomson Reuters and provided through a 
library service. 
9 CiNii is “a database service which can be searched with academic information of articles, books, 
journals, and dissertations. In particular, ‘CiNii Articles’ is a database service which can search for 
information on academic articles published in academic society journals, university research 
bulletins, or articles included in the National Diet Library’s Japanese Periodicals Index Database and 
other databases”. 
8 
 
Ethics, and three articles are published in Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, Management Decision and Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental 
Management. The rest of them are in Business Strategy and the Environment; Business 
and Society, Quality and Quantity; Socio-Economic Review; Accounting and Business 
Research; Systems Research and Behavioral Science; and Corporate Governance. A 
majority of the identified publications can be found in business ethics and corporate 
governance journals, whereas the topic is less discussed in both general management 
and accounting journals. It was observed that the relationship between corporate 
governance and sustainability management has garnered low interest in accounting 
research. 
A few studies have explored the influence of corporate governance mechanisms 
on firms’ performance (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). These 
studies have focused on how corporate governance mechanisms affect financial 
performance, but several include environmental and social dimensions. Most previous 
studies have paid attention to how corporate governance resolve the divergence of 
interests between firm owners (principal) and managers (agent), concerning financial 
performance. Additionally, an important question that has never been addressed is 
whether corporate governance mechanisms only affect the explicit contract between 
managers and shareholders or the implicit contractual relationship between managers 
and other stakeholders as well (Kock et al., 2012).  
To answer the first research question, which is supposed to observe the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on sustainability performance, we finally analyzed 
28 empirical papers (see Appendix). In what follows, to identify the predictive variables 
of corporate governance associated with sustainability performance, we undertake the 
analysis of the review based on the classification of Aguilera et al. (2015), and 
distinguish mechanisms internally (designed by firm owners) and externally (Kock et al., 
2012). Some scholars suggest that external corporate governance mechanisms, such as 
the market for corporate control, institutional, and regulatory environments, enable to 
determine the growth of firms’ performance (Miroshnychenko et al., 2018). The other 
stream of corporate governance literature emphasizes the internal corporate governance 
mechanisms, which significantly shape firms’ financial performance. In this research, as 
we emphasize “how to monitor and control the management to ensure sustainable 
growth of firms,” internal, organizationally based mechanisms of corporate control and 
external, market-based control mechanisms can be employed to help align the diverse 
interests of stakeholders. Based on this definition, we first conduct a comprehensive 
review to identify if these mechanisms are effective on sustainability performance.  
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The typology of internal and external corporate governance was initially referred 
by Walsh and Seward (1990). This distinction draws on whether the locus of action of a 
given governance mechanism emanates from within the firm or from outside the 
boundaries of a firm (Aguilera et al., 2015). According to Aguilera et al. (2015), the 
primary internal governance mechanisms are summarized in the board of directors, 
ownership, and managerial incentives. The vital external mechanisms focus on the legal 
system, the market for control, external auditors, stakeholder activists, rating 
organizations, and the media. We also identify that managerial control and CEO duality 
have been extensively considered in mainstream governance research. In the following, 
we discuss the literature related to each of these mechanisms and their implications on 
sustainability performance. 
The internal governance mechanisms in selected researches (e.g., Jo and Harjoto, 
2011; Walls et al., 2012) mainly focus on board (e.g., independent directors), ownership 
concentration (e.g., institutional ownership), and management. Furthermore, 
management includes three dimensions: managerial control, managerial incentives, and 
CEO duality. The board here indicates a specific board committee; in particular, it 
indicates the presence of a corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee as it defines 
its internal organization and division of activities, and affects the directors’ involvement 
in shaping the mission and strategy of the company. A CSR committee is responsible for 
reviewing policies and conducts concerning the company’s principles and commitment 
on sustainability issues, and it is involved in the reporting process of social and 
environmental information (Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012). Moreover, many studies 
on corporate governance and CSR consider the other characteristics of the board, such 
as independence, orientation, diversity, and size. Haniffa and Cooke (2005) note that 
increasing the presence of independent directors on the board helps in ensuring board 
independence from management. They can be regarded as accountability mechanisms 
as their role is to help to ensure that companies are pursuing shareholders’ interests, but 
also those of stakeholders. Though there is a positive association between board 
independence and CSR outcomes, there are also mixed results (e.g., de Villers et al., 
2011; Galbreath, 2011; Walls and Hoffman, 2013).  
Previous studies on corporate governance and CSR, as mentioned in the 
Appendix, consider institutional ownership as another majority variable of these studies. 
Jain and Jamali (2016) find that the types of investors, such as pension funds with a 
longer-term investment horizon, support CSR investments, while banking and mutual 
funds with short-term investment interests, may find the cost of engaging in CSR 
unjustified. Aguilera et al. (2006) suggest that a firm’s exposure to investors with a 
10 
 
long-term horizon is positively associated with CSR.  
The third mechanism of internal governance is focused on management, which 
considers CEO duality, managerial control, and managerial incentives. CEO duality 
refers to when the CEO is also the chairperson of the board. It is a common governance 
structure studied in the context of CSR, but findings in this area have been mixed (Walls 
et al., 2012). Berrone and Gomez-Mejia (2009) suggest that separating CEO and chair 
position may play an essential role in helping a CEO to grasp new ideas and new 
behaviors related to environmental issues. However, some studies have argued in favor 
of the combined roles, such as the conflict between two positions due to division of the 
leadership duties (Jain and Jamali, 2016). 
 Managerial control is an aspect of management that is often researched in CSR 
(Walls et al., 2012). It is indicated as the percentage of shares held by inside directors. 
Managerial control, mainly managerial ownership, may stimulate insiders to yield 
short-term profits in favor of long-term value creation. Considering managerial 
entrenchment and arguments, managerial ownership will increase managerial discretion 
in decision-making (Jain and Jamali, 2016). The third aspect of management is 
managerial incentives, particularly executive compensation. Kock et al. (2012) argue 
that in the context of environmental management, the effects of equity-based incentives 
will also help to improve managers’ propensity to engage in pro-environmental 
initiatives because of the aligning of managers’ interests closer to those of stakeholders 
and providing a greater ability to stakeholders to enforce their environmental 
preferences. Thus, when managerial incentives are more, the greater is a firm’s level of 
environmental performance. 
On the other hand, the dominant mechanisms of external governance are 
positioned as the legal system, control from the stock market, external monitoring, the 
rating agency, and media under the context of financial performance in Aguilera et al. 
(2015). In the context of sustainability and CSR, we find that the legal and regulatory 
system and the market for corporate control are claimed to be the fundamental 
mechanisms that facilitate environmental management. First, Kock et al. (2012) claim 
that managers’ exposure to market can help to mitigate the problems resulting from the 
divergence of interests between managers and stakeholders concerning corporate 
environmental management because a greater exposure to the market for corporate 
control can increase stakeholders’ ability to enforce their environmental claims. Second, 
the political and legal system is the other source of alignment of managerial and 
stakeholder interests (Hill and Jones, 1992). Hill and Hitt (1999) suggest a 
well-documented global trend among legislators and regulators to coerce firms toward 
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better environmental performance. The institutional environment can be observed from 
the viewpoint of formal institutions, such as political, legal, and financial systems, and 
informal institutions, such as socially valued beliefs and norms. Matten and Moon 
(2008) argue that in formal institutional mechanisms, the essence of the legal and 
political system at a country-level anticipates that regulations in place could promote a 
narrow pattern of shareholder protection versus stakeholder orientation. Previous 
studies suggest that non-U.S. countries display better compliance and ratings on CSR in 
comparison to the U.S. According to Mackenzie et al. (2013), this difference could be 
explained by the market economy, either a coordinated market economy or a liberal 
market economy.  
To investigate the situation of Japanese companies, we conduct a literature review 
considering the same method. CiNii is chosen as the journal database, and all the same 
keywords are used. Yamada et al. (2016) remark that relevance of CSR to corporate 
governance has not been adequately clarified in literature or practice. The study 
describes and compares the social responsibility standard (ISO26000) with the 
corporate governance code in Japan to understand their relationship. It suggests 
integrating corporate governance and sustainability management not only in academic 
research, but in practice as well. There are some other articles concerning the 
association between corporate governance and sustainability issues. For example, 
Tanimoto (2014) suggests incorporating CSR into corporate governance; Miyajima 
(2017) stands the viewpoint of stakeholder theory to approach sustainability issues and 
corporate governance; and Imai (2013) adopts the seven principles of ISO26000 in the 
decision-making of the board and its implementation. Tanimoto (2014) indicates that 
based on prior overseas research, CSR and corporate governance have been understood 
separately, but in recent years, these two have been related to each other and are 
regarded as overlapping concepts. It also denotes that for companies to make profits and 
create shareholder value, it is necessary to respond to the needs of stakeholders. Hence, 
CSR is rooted in organizations by having strong internal corporate governance, and 
corporate governance can become active by sustainable CSR activities. In summary, in 
regards to the discussion between sustainability and corporate governance in Japan, it 
can be stated that the relationships and importance of both the sides were not wholly 
conscious. The discussion about the more specific relationships and roles of both sides 
is still inadequate. Therefore, with the social background in Japan, we consider the 
central theme of the relationship between sustainability and corporate governance, 
which is not clarified at this stage. 
Through the literature review, we summarize the knowledge of the association 
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between corporate governance and sustainability management into the following points. 
First, when dominant paradigms exist, it was observed that various theoretical 
frameworks have been applied to the assumptions. For example, agency theory is 
regarded as the dominant paradigm in corporate governance research. However, it falls 
short in explaining why and how sustainability targets should be included in corporate 
strategic goals. Second, research makes no distinction between the types of 
sustainability managements, even though we consider a multidimensional definition, 
including environmental and social into the study. However, in practice, companies treat 
them differently. Third, we observe many equivocalities of the findings, which need to 
be reexamined from a multilevel with organizations’ multidimensional activities. Thus, 
to shed more light on the precise relationship between the two, we need a more 
empirical test to enhance our understanding of the linkages between corporate 
governance sustainability management. 
 
2.2 Environmental management control system and sustainability performance 
 
In general, MCS has two roles in exerting control over the attainment of 
organizational goals and enabling employees to search for opportunities and solve 
problems (Ahrens and Chapman, 2005; Mundy, 2010; Simons, 1995). MCS is the 
systems and processes in place to monitor and bond employee behavior to 
organizational objectives (Malmi and Brown, 2008). Gond et al. (2012) claim that MCS 
enables the integration of environmental issues with organizational practices. Guenther 
et al. (2016) argue that the integration of sustainability in general and environmental 
aspects in particular into MCS are now being addressed in MCS research. It also claims 
that the concept of environmental management control systems (EMCS) provides a 
promising approach for integrating the currently fragmented lines of internal drivers and 
managerial processes that may foster firms’ environmental performance and push 
organizations in the direction of sustainability. In their research, they position MCS as a 
starting point for EMCS. 
MCS appearing in academic research until now can be summed up to the MCS 
system of Anthony (1965), Levers of Control (LoC) framework of Simons (1995), the 
object of control framework of Merchant and Van der Stede (2012), and MCS package 
of Malmi and Brown (2008). The LoC framework consists of four levers of control, 
beliefs system, boundary system, diagnostic control, and interactive use. While the 
beliefs system emphasizes the core values and norms of the organization, the boundary 
system refers to the risks that organizations should avoid. The diagnostic system 
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monitors the critical performance variables, while interactive use facilitates the 
communication and discussion of strategic uncertainty. The object of control by 
Merchant and Van der Stede (2012) consists of four control differences with Simons’ 
(1995): result control, action control, personnel control, and cultural control. Result 
control focuses on the outcomes of employee behavior, action control monitors 
activities and process, personnel control decides employees’ recruiting and training, and 
cultural control considers corporate culture and incentive system (Guenther et al., 2016). 
In particular, the framework of Malmi and Brown (2008) conveys that the 
understanding of MCS should be regarded as a package. In this package, MCS 
differentiates cultural controls (clans, values, and symbols), planning (e.g., action 
planning), cybernetic controls, rewards and compensation, and administrative controls 
(governance structure, organizational structure, and policies and procedures).  
Langfield-Smith (2008) argues that in previous researches, to implement a 
strategy, management control practices constituted a valuable tool that was used to 
translate intentions into practices. In several streams of management control research, 
LoC, that was proposed by Simons (1995), has become an influential framework to 
examine the link between strategy and management control practices operating as a 
system (e.g., Henri, 2006; Journeault et al., 2016; Mundy, 2010; Tessier and Otley, 
2012; Widener, 2007). The development of ideas for sustainability management, such as 
integration of environmental aspects into management controls to translate strategic 
environmental intents into eco-practices, can be found in Arjalies and Mundy (2013), 
Gond et al. (2012), and Pondeville et al. (2013). Scholars have begun to link existing 
frameworks of MCS to a wide range of topics on environmental issues and 
sustainability. This development is driven by speculation that MCS and its role in 
strategic coordination and organizational learning can be adapted to environmental 
problems. Therefore, EMCS promotes effective integration of environmental issues in 
the process of strategy development and strategy implementation; aligns corporate 
decision-making, employee actions, and actions with environmental targets; and 
identifies new threats and opportunities (Gond et al., 2016; Guenther et al., 2016; Lisi, 
2015).  
On the other hand, Guenther et al. (2016) indicate that “several factors may 
simultaneously drive both environmental strategies employed, commonly classified 
along a continuum from reactive to proactive approaches, and another line of inquiry 
that focuses on issues related to corporate governance. Though research on the 
consequences of corporate governance mechanisms has a long tradition, scholars have 
recently begun to specifically explore the relationship between corporate governance 
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and environmental performance”.  
The MCS package of Malmi and Brown (2008) includes corporate governance of 
MCS as one of the administrative controls because governance includes the formal lines 
of authority of accountability as well as the systems which are in place to ensure that 
representatives of the various functions and organizational units meet to coordinate their 
activities both vertically and horizontally (Malmi and Brown, 2008, p.295). As a 
governance structure can be designed in many ways in any given organization, 
researchers should not group them, but instead study how they are linked to each other 
and other controls. 
Considering the literature review, the study on sustainability performance is one 
of the areas regarding the measurement of sustainability management. Scholars 
highlight the growing significance of sustainability due to a global sense of 
improvement of corporate governance. However, in the same vein, as the empirical 
research of the impact of corporate governance on sustainability performance has not 
been examined in Japanese companies, to grasp the situation, the findings of the review 
recognize the necessity to reexamine the interplay among governance management and 
sustainability performance. The complete empirical research design is explained in the 
next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
3. Analytical framework and research method  
 
3.1 Analytical framework of corporate governance, management control, and 
sustainability performance 
 
“Sustainability performance” could reflect the outcome of a firm’s strategic 
activities toward sustainable thinking. Managing sustainability is challenging and 
requires an appropriate management framework that integrates environmental and social 
performance with economic business performance (Schaltegger and Wagner, 2006). 
Thus, sustainability performance includes several factors based on economic, 
environmental, and social issues (Epstein, 2008; Schaltegger and Wagner, 2006) in this 
study. 
The literature review puts forward several reasons to show that corporate 
governance plays a role in sustainability performance. For instance, Walls et al. (2012) 
indicate that since environmental initiatives require investment and have long-term 
strategic implications, they can be risky and have an impact on the capital structure of 
the firm and its viability. Moreover, addressing sustainability activities extends the 
influence of a firm across stakeholders. The main role of corporate governance is to 
monitor or discipline top managers’ behavior for shareholders, while exploring the 
corporate governance–sustainability performance link, how do corporate governance 
mechanisms foster sustainability performance? As reviewed in Chapter 2, we can 
investigate this research purpose in the following four aspects: (1) What is the 
relationship between ownership and sustainability performance? (2) How do directors 
affect sustainability performance? (3) What is the role of managerial incentives in 
sustainability performance? (4) What is the role of EMCS in the relationship between 
corporate governance and environmental sustainability performance?  
We employ statistical methods to test the empirical data to yield insights on the 
nature of the phenomenon. This study aims to conduct an appraisal of how corporate 
governance correlates with environmental and social performance.  
 
3.1.1 Impact of corporate governance on sustainability performance 
Figure 1 shows the complete preconceived analytical framework. Despite the 
understanding that corporate governance may influence environmental and social issues, 
we also notice that there is no dominant paradigm to explain the tension between the 
board and top managers, and there is no appreciate theory building and advancing this 
phenomenon. In Japan, the most important observation is that the study of the corporate 
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governance–sustainability dynamic has begun recently, but lacks empirical estimation. 
Therefore, in this framework, in the relationship between corporate governance and 
sustainability performance, Path I is designed to examine the direct effect of each 
independent corporate governance mechanism on sustainability performance, mainly 
centering on answering the following questions mentioned above: (1) What is the 
relationship between ownership and sustainability performance? (2) How do directors 
affect sustainability performance? (3) What is the role of managerial incentives in 
sustainability performance?, as these three aspects reflect the essential mechanisms to 
balance the power of monitoring and advising in a governance context.  
When considering the effect of corporate governance, prior literature review 
provides us one distinction which divides corporate governance from the subject of 
monitoring function into two domains: “external governance” that can discipline top 
managers outside the company. As we discuss that corporate governance extends to 
stakeholder-oriented, the power of monitoring can not only be from the stock market, 
media, and auditing companies, but also the government, non-government organizations, 
communities, buyers, and suppliers. The second is “internal governance” that can 
control the top management from the company insiders, such as the board of directors, 
ownership and management with managerial control, managerial incentives, and CEO 
duality. Internal governance is defined as the discipline of corporate managers through 
intra-organizational mechanisms, which is built by company insiders (board members, 
employees, etc.) involved in the decision-making and operations. With this division of 
internal problems and external matters, we have to clarify more points of argument.   
As described previously, corporate governance disciplines top managers’ behavior 
from the aspects of ownership, directors, and managerial incentives. The following 
explains how these mechanisms can influence sustainability performance.  
Ownership. In European and Asian countries, whether the ratio of outsider 
shareholders, particularly foreign institutional investors has a significant effect on 
performance has become the focal point. A number of previous studies provided clarity 
on the fact that the proportion of foreign shareholders has a positive effect on 
performance. For example, Miyajima and Nitta (2011), and Miyajima and Yasuda 
(2015) show that the rise in ownership ratio of foreign institutional investors has a 
positive influence on performance, such as Tobin’q and return on assets (ROA). 
However, the above discussion is exclusively concerned with financial performance. 
When the argument is from the point of view of sustainability approach, several articles 
(e.g., Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Harjoto and Jo, 2011; Jo and Harjoto, 2011; Oh et al., 
2011) have provided evidence that institutional ownership with a longer-term 
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investment horizon support CSR investment, and few studies investigate the impact on 
environmental sustainability performance in Japan. The presence of stakeholder 
activists and their motivation for improving CSR as well as the response to their 
pressures have also been found. The existence of some results is neutral, and adverse 
effect is also observed. Thus, this is the other reason why we reexamine the mechanism 
of foreign institutional ownership in this study.  
Board of directors. Several studies argue that board independences determine the 
CSR engagement of a firm. Thus, a higher ratio of independent directors means that the 
board has a more effective advisory function forming sustainability alliance with 
external stakeholders (Post et al., 2015). Walls et al. (2012) also show that board 
independence is positively correlated with environmental concerns. There is a 
significant agreement on the fact that there is no ideal composition, which is reasonable 
for all companies in the board of directors, and it has been empirically examined that the 
appointment of independent directors will produce a positive performance. On the other 
hand, though a positive association between board independence and sustainability 
performance was found in some articles, some evidence and the literature review show 
mixed results. Consequently, the investigation of Japanese companies is necessary. 
Management. Management here means the management of the board. Thus, a 
study on management and sustainability performance has a look at CEO duality. CEO 
duality denotes that the CEO is also the chairperson of the board. From a stewardship 
perspective, CEO duality leads to concentration of managerial power, enabling 
managers to embed sustainability activities positively, if considered to be a benefit to 
organizations (Godos-Diez et al., 2011).  
Code and norms. In the previous literature review, the actual effects of external 
corporate governance mechanisms were concluded to a law system, the market for 
corporate control, external auditing, rating organizations, stakeholder activism, and 
media. Considering that the findings are equivocal and sustainability is a 
multidimensional construct, in practice, companies treat social and environmental issues 
differently (Strike et al., 2006). In the same sense, treating environmental issues and 
economic growth is different in practice. Though we mention that internal governance 
mechanisms are not specially designed for environmental strategy, the difference in 
treating environmental issues can be reflected by external governance mechanisms, 
typically for example, the codes and norms. With regard to environmental issues, a 
number of environmental preservation activities are conducted voluntarily in 
comparison to the legal system (e.g., Kim et al., 2015). Norms, and the code of conducts, 
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such as GRI10 Standards and ISO1400111, seem to be more important to influence the 
philosophical policy of companies. Consequently, instead of the legal system, the 
adoption of GRI guidelines is regarded as an external governance mechanism to 
influence environmental sustainability performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Research framework used in this study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.2 Mediating effect of MCSs  
Several reasons can be summed up through the literature review from the 
perspective of methodological and theoretical issues. These reasons reflect different 
aspects: (1) the lack of a theoretical foundation; (2) a definite relation of causality; (3) 
the lack of consideration of mediating effects. In addition, Russo and Minto (2012) 
mention that we have not done enough to study the mediating influences that stand 
between larger concepts. Hence, we cannot neglect the influence of mediating in this 
study.  
                                                     
10 GRI helps businesses and governments globally to understand and communicate their impact on 
critical sustainability issues, such as climate change, human rights, governance, and social 
well-being. The GRI Sustainability Reporting Standards (GRI Standards) are developed with true 
multi-stakeholder contributions and rooted in public interest  
(https://www.globalreporting.org/information/about-gri/Pages/default.aspx).  
11 The ISO 14000 standards provide practical tools for all types of companies and organizations 
looking to manage their environment responsibilities. ISO14001 was revised in 2015. It sets out the 
criteria for an environmental management system and can be certified to. It maps out a framework 
that a company or organization can follow to set up an effective environmental management system. 
It can be used by any organization, regardless of its activity and sector 
(https://www.iso.org/iso-14001-environmental-management.html). 
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The publication of the Corporate Governance Code reflected the growing 
awareness of corporate sustainability. Within companies, the internal control system has 
been pushed to strengthen under the pressure of globalization and stakeholders 
(Takehana, 2005). For example, in 2018, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of 
the Treadway Commission’s (COSO’s)12 updated framework highlights the importance 
of considering risk in both the strategy-setting process and in driving performance to 
enhance the role of internal control to achieve value creation. To involve various 
stakeholders and build sustainable corporate governance, it is essential to embed the 
elements of management control by further profoundly connecting the concept of 
governance. In Wang and Sarkis (2017), CSR governance is defined as control 
mechanisms in which companies engage and prove to have an important role in 
influencing companies’ CSR outcomes. This result hints the mediating influence of 
EMCSs between two larger concepts, corporate governance mechanisms and 
environmental outcomes. 
Moreover, beyond the legal and social influences, corporate governance practices 
in any country are influenced by what is considered to be the best practice. However, 
knowledge of what constitutes best practice, either in general or in any specific setting, 
is incomplete and uncertain (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2012). Thus, Merchant and 
Van der Stede state that though firms face a dynamic environment, corporate 
governance systems and MCSs are inseparably linked. MCS focuses on the top 
management to help with the most appropriate decisions and requires what can be done 
to ensure appropriate behaviors of managers and employees in an organization, while 
the purpose of corporate governance is controlling the behaviors of the top management 
and those of all the other employees in the firm. Therefore, Merchant and Van der Stede 
conclude that corporate governance has a prominent link with MCS. Changes in 
corporate governance mechanisms and practices will generally have direct and 
immediate effects on MCS practices and their effectiveness (Merchant and Van der 
Stede, 2012, p.553). Merchant and Van der Stede’s conclusion strengthens our 
suggestion for the mediating effect of MCSs in the analytical framework. 
General MCS is used to measure progress toward achieving organization ends 
(Chenhall, 2003). EMCS is a particular type of MCS, which is integrated into 
                                                     
12 COSO is a joint initiative of the five private sector organizations listed on the American 
Accounting Association, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Financial Executives 
International, The Association of Accountants and Financial Professionals in Business, and The 
Institute of Internal Auditors. In 2004, COSO revised the framework to add the elements of 
enterprise risk management (ERM). Further, it included a 2017 update to the Enterprise Risk 
Management–Integrated Framework (COSO and WBCSD, 2018). 
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environmental aspects (Journeault et al., 2016). Through the literature review in Chapter 
2, we understand that the conceptualizations of EMCS are possible to be integrated into 
the general MCS concept of Merchant and Van der Stede (2012). Therefore, Path II in 
Figure 1 presents the above thought, focusing on the relationship among corporate 
governance, EMCS, and environmental sustainability performance. Considering the 
reason that this study focuses on sustainability, all the hypotheses adopt a general 
management system that integrates sustainability concept, such as EMCS. On the other 
hand, as corporate governance is not so conscious of a company, it is primarily regarded 
as a constraint factor of the management. The disciplinary factors relating to corporate 
governance are presented with the internal control system and morals of managers 
(Miyajima, 2017). When there are alternative variations at the time of introducing the 
system of corporate governance, managers may subjectively make a selection. Whether 
the corporate governance system introduced is operated as expected by the designer or 
not depends on the manager’s decision. Considering corporate reputation and legitimacy 
in the long-term, a positive correlation has sufficient reason to be fostered by top 
managers. In addition, managers’ morals and regulations based on the law prevent 
corporate scandals, while the discipline of external corporate governance is not 
significantly emphasized (Miyajima, 2017). Ultimately, corporate governance as a 
constraint factor is concerned with management discretion and monitoring intensity, 
which are both necessary for balance.  
 
3.2 Research method 
 
In this study, as we aim to investigate how corporate governance correlates to 
environmental performance, more specifically, explore how corporate governance 
discipline top managers’ behavior, we test the direct effects of codes or norms, foreigner 
ownership, independent directors, and management governance variables against 
environmental performance and social performance. Moreover, we begin this direct test 
as the first step to develop a theoretical background. The first research question deals 
with investigating a set of independent external and internal governance mechanisms on 
sustainability performance. Path I in Figure 1 tests and verifies the analytical framework 
by conducting multiple regression analysis. The study’s variables are tested in several 
ways. As sustainability performance is multidimensional, we pick two aspects, 
environmental performance and social performance as dependent variables from Toyo 
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Keizai CSR13. The Toyo Keizai CSR database evaluates the score for every category 
and provides different scores, including financial score, environmental score, social 
score, and governance score. In order to eliminate the endogenous effect, environmental 
score and social score are adopted as dependent variables. On the other hand, we select 
independent variables relevant to corporate governance aspects relying on prior work in 
this area. They are presented by the impact of GRI Standards, foreign ownership, 
independent directors, and CEO duality. These variables are collected from the 
databases of Bloomberg ESG, Toyo Keizai CSR, and Nikkei Corporate Governance 
Evaluation System. To ensure that this investigation is conducted considering a middle- 
and long-term perspective, 4-year panel dataset is finally used in the regression model. 
Nevertheless, it is not sufficient to respond to the research question “what type of 
management controls are the top managers using to make sustainability practice more 
effective?” by only depending on investigating the effects of independent governance 
mechanisms. Figure 1 Path II shows the mediating effect of EMCS. We adopt SEM to 
examine the relationship among governance variables, EMCS, and environmental 
performance because SEM is the most appreciated method to investigate the statistical 
model, including the mediating effect, and can simultaneously analyze the causal 
relation and the correlation between each variable. With respect to governance 
mechanisms, we employ the same variables as Path I to maintain consistency in the 
study. Further, to observe the sustainable behavior aspect supposed as EMCS in the 
analytical model, the concrete environmental management activities and environmental 
performance are investigated through a questionnaire survey. Each item of the 
questionnaire is constructed by referring to the previous research. After pretesting, we 
sent the questionnaires to 1,697 companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, the first 
section in February 2015. Finally, we selected environmental performance representing 
sustainability performance as the dependent variable for this examination because in 
comparison to social performance, environmental practices tend to differ from other 
social practices as they are technical, require specific firm capabilities and significant 
capital investment, are guided by regulation, and have their own reporting criteria 
(Walls et al., 2012). 
 
 
                                                     
13 The Toyo Keizai CSR database is the most prominent database for CSR information in Japan. The 
data are collected from a comprehensive survey of all listed and major unlisted companies, and 
provide effective results of approximately 1400 companies. Three categories in four files, workforce 
1, workforce 2, CSR overall, and environment are covered. 
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4. Direct impact of corporate governance on sustainability 
performance 
 
As previous empirical studies have not yielded significant progress for 
establishing the clear theoretical background for corporate governance and 
sustainability performance, we believe that clearer and more compelling findings should 
be provided. Hence, depending on the analytical framework supposed in Figure 1 Path I, 
we explore the direct effect of corporate governance mechanisms on sustainability 
performance through fact-based examination. This examination tries to employ a 
coherent approach that examines four key aspects of governance structures, which cover 
both external mechanisms and internal mechanisms: GRI standards, foreigner 
ownership, independent directors, and CEO duality.  
 
4.1 Hypotheses development 
 
Corporate governance strategies that are associated with respectful environmental 
behaviors include a high number of independent directors on the board and the 
separation of the CEO and board chair positions (Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al., 2016). We 
analyze the adoption of GRI standards, proportion of foreigner ownership, number of 
independent directors, and CEO duality as corporate governance mechanisms because 
these four structures have been identified for their potential to foster better social and 
environmental performance (e.g., Walls et al., 2012). However, we also find mixed 
results in empirical studies (e.g., Berrone and Gomez-Mejia, 2009). Thus, little is 
known about the effectiveness of these structures on fostering firms’ environmental and 
social sustainability performance. This shows the need for reexamination.  
GRI standards. In comparison to the research on internal corporate governance, 
external governance mechanisms have not been the focus until now. Aguilera et al. 
(2015) emphasize that internal mechanisms can lead to active monitoring of executives. 
However, external mechanisms are typically activated when internal mechanisms for 
controlling managerial opportunism have failed. Thus, the role of internal governance 
mechanisms is not isolated. Meanwhile, external factors play a role of directly and 
indirectly determining the effectiveness of a firm’s governance. Ortiz-de-Mandojana et 
al. (2016) provide evidence that “corporate environmental management has stressed on 
the importance of external legitimization and its relationship to opportunities for 
organizations to access resources that contribute to their long-term viability. Firms need 
to comply with institutional pressures to maintain their competitive positions in their 
23 
 
operating environments”. These pressures arise from external factors, such as 
government, regulators, markets, and society. These external factors impose regulatory, 
normative, and cognitive pressures on managers. Therefore, explicit codes and norms 
are significant drivers of sustainability performance. 
 Nowadays, companies are faced with different stakeholder demands, continually 
shifting priorities, and a multitude of alternatives to address their sustainability 
challenges (Searcy, 2012). Thus, with the development and widespread voluntary 
uptake, international standards and frameworks for corporate responsibility, such as the 
United Nations Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), provide 
broad principles and reporting frameworks. GRI standards reflecting the knowledge and 
practice of sustainability or CSR have gained global significance (Klettner et al., 2014). 
It also indicates that GRI standards can combine the strengths of the central 
international CSR and sustainability initiatives, and make frameworks more compatible 
and coherent. Considering the result of our literature review, there are only a few studies 
focusing on the link between external corporate governance mechanisms and 
sustainability performance. For example, Kock et al. (2012) argue that top managers 
who have greater exposure to legal and regulatory systems have more incentives to act 
in the stakeholders’ interests and to follow their environmental demands. Gainet (2010) 
and Jo and Harjoto (2011) provide evidence on the link between legal system, code of 
conduct, and corporate environmental performance. In turn, we hypothesize the 
following:  
  
Hypothesis 1: A company that implements GRI standards is ranked higher in terms of 
sustainability performance. 
 
Independent directors. Previous studies have linked independent directors to 
improvements in firms’ social and environmental behaviors. Slawinski (2010) argues 
that a board with a higher percentage of independent directors will tend to adopt 
long-term horizons and be more willing to develop sustainable behaviors. Independent 
directors are aware of the needs and expectations of various stakeholders, so it is more 
likely that they will recognize that their responsibilities are higher than the shareholders. 
Furthermore, Walls et al. (2012) find that an independent board is positively correlated 
to environmental performance. There are also scholars who argue that the board of 
directors who have previous environmental experience have more advisory role on 
facilitating sustainability performance (Walls and Hoffman, 2013). Considering either 
the role of monitoring or advising independent directors, we suppose the following:  
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Hypothesis 2: A higher proportion of independent directors represented in corporate 
boards positively impacts environmental performance. 
 
Foreign ownership. Previous studies have suggested that the percentage of 
foreign ownership has a positive effect on fostering environmental and social practices. 
This issue is important given the recent introduction of foreign owners into listed 
companies. Cheung et al. (2015) report that CSR performance in listed companies is 
increasing their degree of globalization. The underlying premise is that international 
counter-parties, particularly those from developed markets, possess longer-standing and 
more-ingrained attitudes toward sustainability. Cheung et al. (2015) argue that foreign 
parties demand suppliers’ compliance with CSR norms. In terms of the geographical 
sourcing of revenues, they report stronger “internationalization” effects in non-state 
ownership enterprises. The empirical evidence offers only limited guidance in respect of 
foreign ownership. For example, Oh et al. (2011) and Soliman et al. (2012) examine 
higher CSR rankings in firms with greater foreign and institutional holdings. In contrast, 
in Barnea and Rubin (2010), the result provides evidence of weak foreign institutional 
holding effects in the U.S. Dam and Scholtens (2012) also provide limited association 
for the European market. However, Wang et al. (2016) find a positive relationship in 
Chinese-listed firms. In the process of improving sustainability performance, firms 
surely feel the pressure from this type of stakeholders. Thus, we hypothesize as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3: A higher proportion of foreign ownership positively impacts 
environmental performance. 
 
CEO duality. Finally, studies on the management of corporate governance and 
sustainability performance also consider CEO duality (Walls et al., 2012). CEO duality 
indicates that a CEO is also the chairperson of the board. It is a common governance 
mechanism to discuss the power of controlling. A chair who is not a CEO may be less 
pressured to produce positive short-term outcomes and is better positioned to argue that 
non-compliance with environmental law produces undesirable long-term social and 
financial liabilities (Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al., 2016). However, Berrone and 
Gomez-Mejia (2009) find no correlation between CEO duality and environmental 
performance. O’Connor et al. (2006) report that CEO duality has a weak and positive 
role of a moderator. Thus, we suppose our hypothesis standing on the viewpoint of the 
stewardship theory as follows: 
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Hypothesis 4: A separate CEO positively impacts environmental performance. 
 
4.2 Research method 
 
4.2.1 Sample selection  
To investigate the above hypotheses, the research strategy consists of searching 
archival data by quantitative analyses. In terms of the limitation of the archival 
databases, Toyo Keizai CSR database, Nikkei NEEDS Corporate Governance 
evaluation systems (Cges), and Bloomberg database are used in this research.  
Toyo Keizai CSR database is the most prominent database of CSR information in 
Japan. The agent conducts a comprehensive survey of all listed and major unlisted 
companies, and provides effective results of approximately 1,300 companies. For 
instance, version 2015 provides information of 1,305 companies (1,259 listed and 56 
unlisted).  
Nikkei NEEDS Cges is a database with detailed data and well-defined criteria that 
enables one to evaluate the corporate governance of listed Japanese companies. It 
covers approximately 3,600 companies. The data categories include capital efficiency, 
equity market evaluation, shareholders, board structure, board performance, return to 
shareholders, and disclosures of approximately 110 items.  
Bloomberg is a financial services system that provides financial and economic 
information on all market sectors globally and includes environmental, social, and 
governance performance indicators from its CSR, annual reports, and Bloomberg 
Sustainability survey. In addition, Bloomberg includes responses to CDP questionnaires 
as part of its environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) data 
(Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al., 2016). 
For inclusion in this study, sample firms have to meet the following criteria: 
 
(1) Companies should be included in the Toyo Keizai, Nikkei Cges, and Bloomberg 
from 2012 to 2015.  
(2) Companies should be listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
 
CSR ranking from Toyo Keizai CSR database is adopted to represent 
sustainability performance. In addition, Toyo Keizai CSR database also rated 
environmental and social scores. Thus, in the following investigation, sustainability 
performance is represented by CSR ranking, environmental score, and social score. 
After excluding observations with missing values, the final sample is 875 for both 
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environmental score and social scores.  
 
4.2.2 Measurement of variables 
A fixed effects model is used to determine the impact of governance mechanisms 
on sustainability performance (environmental score and social score) controlling firm 
economic characteristics, size, and years. Four variables are chosen to represent 
corporate governance mechanisms on the basis of theoretical and multi-level framework 
discussed in the preceding section. 
 
Env_score = β0+β1GRI+β2FRGN+β3IDRTO+β4CEODUA+β5ROA 
+β6ln_Sales +αt+е                             (1)  
 
Social_score = β0+β1GRI+β2FRGN+β3IDRTO+β4CEODUA+β5ROA 
+β6ln_Sales +αt+е                          (2)         
 
where αt denotes fixed effects of year t and e is an error term. 
 
Dependent variables 
The sustainability performance assessments are constructed by using Toyo Keizai 
CSR database. Toyo Keizai Inc. conducts a comprehensive survey of all listed and 
major unlisted companies, and provides effective results. This database is one of the 
most authoritative and certified dataset concerning CSR information in Japan. This 
product has been available since version 2006. However, some items are not included in 
the old version and remedy the questionnaire every year. Thus, in this study, since the 
same indicators for sustainability performance have to be employed, the period from 
2012 to 2015 has been fixed. These 4 years have the same question format for 
environment category. This database creates three categories, Workforce 1 and 2, CSR 
overall, and environment across four fields: human resource utilization, environment, 
corporate governance, and sociality. The evaluation items are basically based on a 
questionnaire survey. But for those companies, which are not providing their answers to 
the questionnaire, public information is used for evaluation. The evaluation method is 
the all-item point addition, and it will not be deducted by answering negative data. From 
the viewpoint of information disclosure, it adds to the fact if there was an effective 
response. As there is a span of the survey period and release time, resent incidents or 
scandals are not included in the evaluation. Considering that the evaluation of CSR 
ranking includes governance aspects, to avoid the endogeneity problem, we employ the 
environmental and social scores represented as sustainability performance. 
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Independent variables 
In this section, four independent variables are chosen to investigate corporate 
governance mechanisms from institutional pressure and external stakeholders’ pressure. 
These four variables are employed based on Toyo Keizai CSR, Nikkei NEEDS Cges, 
and Bloomberg databases. GRI denotes the external institutional dimension that 
companies have established business ethical guidelines and/or compliance policy in the 
conduct of company business, whether the company is in compliance with GRI criteria 
or not. FRGN and IDRTO can be analyzed as external stakeholders. FRGN denotes the 
fraction of shareholders who are foreigners. In Mallin et al. (2013), FRGN is examined 
to have positive impacts on monitoring companies to improve corporate responsibility. 
IDRTO represents the percentage of independent directors on the board, which is also 
tested in Kock et al. (2012) and clarified by a positive relationship with environmental 
performance.  
 
Control variables 
Financial performance. Profitability is related to the attention that a firm gives to 
sustainability issues. We use the measure of ROA as it is frequently cited in the 
literature as an indicator of a company’s financial performance (Ortiz-de-Mandojana et 
al., 2016). 
Firm size. Economies of scale are one the structural determinants of fostering 
sustainability practice. We control for firm size using the natural logarithm of total sales 
and the number of employees in order to prevent bias. Table 1 shows the definition of 
all the variables. 
 
Table 1 Definitions of the Variables 
 
Variable Description Database Time period
Dependent Variables
Enviro_score the score is provided by Toyo Keizai CSR database Toyo Keizai CSR 2013 - 2016
Social _score the score is provided by Toyo Keizai CSR database Toyo Keizai CSR 2013 - 2016
Independent Variables
GRI
Indicates whether the company's application level was checked by the
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)
Bloomberg 2012 - 2015
CEODUA Indicates whether the company's Chief Executive Officer is also
Chairman of the Board, as reported by the company. "0" indicates the
two roles are separate.
Bloomberg
2012 - 2015
IDRTO the proportion of independent directors on board Nikkei NEEDS Cges 2012 - 2015
FRGN the proportion of foreigner ownership Nikkei NEEDS Cges 2012 - 2015
Control Variables
ROA return on assets Nikkei NEEDS Cges 2012 - 2015
ln_Sales natural logrithm of net sales Nikkei NEEDS FQ 2012 - 2015
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4.3 Results  
 
We ran the models testing the direct effects of corporate governance variables on 
environmental performance and social performance separately. Stata software is used to 
estimate the regression model illustrated by equations (1) and (2). Since the dataset in 
this study is unbalanced panel data, we examined pooling regression model, fixed 
effects model, and random effects model. Built on the result of Hausman test and F test, 
fixed effects model is examined as an explicit result. The sample comprises of 875 for 
both environmental score and social score. Table 2 reports the means and standard 
deviations, and Table 3 reports the correlations of all the variables used in this study.  
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
Environmental
Score
Social Score IDRTO GRI CEODUA FRGN ROA ln_Sales
Environmental Score 1
Social Score 0.683 1
IDRTO 0.173 0.313 1
GRI 0.331 0.499 0.193 1
CEODUA -0.201 -0.246 -0.156 -0.130 1
FRGN 0.306 0.407 0.382 0.250 -0.104 1
ROA -0.054 0.032 0.044 0.020 0.020 0.303 1
ln_Sales 0.549 0.619 0.227 0.441 -0.296 0.538 -0.042 1
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
Environmental Score 915 79.885 13.495 35.200 100.000 
Social Score 915 79.546 13.363 37.000 100.000 
Independent Variables 
GRI 921 0.570 0.495 0 1 
FRGN 960 22.802 12.591 0.420 74.230 
IDRTO 960 18.981 15.599 0.000 85.714 
CEODUA 954 0.636 0.481 0 1 
Control Variables 
ROA 956 6.024 3.792 -10.391 21.805 
ln_Sales 960 12.734 1.370 9.323 17.162 
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Table 4 Fixed Effects Regression Result 
 
Notes: Models (1) and (2) show the results of fixed effects regression model, significant at *** 
1%, ** 5%, and *10% levels.  
 
The results of the regression analyses are listed in Table 4. Regression for the 
environmental score (Model 1) shows a positive association with the proportion of 
independent directors. In the social score model (Model 2), the regression result is the 
same as the environmental score. Hypothesis 1 suggests that with the implementation of 
GRI standards, companies have better sustainability performance. Models 1 and 2 show 
that normative pressures do not significantly influence sustainability performance 
(environmental score and social score). Thus, Hypothesis 1 is not supported by our 
sample. 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that a higher percentage of independent directors can 
improve sustainability performance. Model 1 shows that a higher proportion of 
independent directors fosters firms’ sustainability performance, environmental 
performance (0.065, p<0.05), and social performance (0.079, p<0.01). Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2 is accepted.  
Hypothesis 3 suggests that a higher proportion of foreign ownership can enhance 
sustainability performance. Models 1 and 2 show that a higher percentage of foreign 
VARIABLES
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
IDRTO 0.065 0.027** 0.079 0.027***
GRI -0.331 0.758 0.957 0.769
CEODUA 0.025 0.489 -0.003 0.497
FRGN 0.032 0.046 0.053 0.047
ROA 0.041 0.063 -0.007 0.064
ln_Sales 0.917 1.586 6.835 1.610
***
Constant 66.992 19.861
*** -10.800 20.167
Firm fixed effects
Observations
Year
R-squared
(1)
Environmental Score
(2)
Social Score
869
0.024
869
0.095
Yes Yes
2012-2015 2012-2015
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shareholders does not influence sustainability performance. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not 
supported by our data.  
Finally, Hypothesis 4 suggests that a separate CEO can improve environmental 
and social performance. Models 1 and 2 show that a separate chair does not affect 
environmental and social performance. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is not supported for our data. 
 
4.4 Discussion  
 
In this chapter, we address the first research question by examining the direct 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms on sustainability performance. With 
respect to the method, the fixed effect model is adopted for examination. We 
specifically analyzed whether domains of governance mechanisms, GRI standards, 
independent directors, foreigner ownership, and CEO duality have an influence on 
environmental and social performance. The result provides us evidence of the key role 
of independent directors, who have positive influence on environmental and social 
performance.  
Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al. (2014) find that there are two thoughts to explain the 
role of independent directors. The first was mentioned previously; if independent 
directors have the realization of long-term horizons and the knowledge of developing 
sustainable behaviors, a board with a larger number of independent directors would 
have a positive relation with environmental and social performance. The second is if the 
independent directors lack insiders’ expertise and experience, the board would lose its 
ability to monitor environmental and social performance, and deteriorate performance 
results. The potential explanation for our finding is consistent with the former thought 
that independent directors who are more conscious of the implementation of CSR or 
sustainability strategy in companies are able to support top managers to enforce new 
ideas and new behaviors related to environmental and social issues. Furthermore, our 
finding implies that independent directors perhaps realize the needs and expectations of 
various stakeholders (Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al., 2014), and their responsibilities are not 
only to monitor firms’ behavior, but also to undertake the role of advisory. Therefore, 
they have sufficient power to influence top managers’ motivation on firms’ decisions to 
gain legitimacy and ensure the long-term survival of the firm. 
Contrary to our expectations, we did not find any evidence to support the notion 
of the effectiveness of GRI standards, the proportion of foreign ownership, and separate 
CEO in encouraging environmental and social sustainability. GRI standards have been 
adopted by companies globally as a means of integrated reporting. The format of GRI 
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standards provides a detailed framework for reporting: the aim is to offer a methodology 
for measuring and disclosing information so that it can then be meaningfully compared 
and benchmarked across different companies (Klettner et al., 2014). However, Patten 
(2002) provides suggestion according to the legitimacy-based arguments, that if 
companies have poorer environmental performance, which do increase the threat to the 
firms’ social legitimacy, there is a trend among companies to provide greater 
environmental disclosure. Therefore, though GRI standards can be regarded as an 
external governance mechanism for normative pressure, it is originally adopted for 
disclosure and we should not neglect that it has a role toward legitimacy as well. This 
explanation is potentially related to our finding of GRI standards. With regard to CEO 
duality, there are two different thoughts in previous studies. One is that a separate CEO 
has less pressure to consider short-term interests and a capacity to argue compliance 
with environmental and social issues. The other is what Tricker (2009) argues that 
dividing leadership duties can lead to the conflict of decision-making. This maybe the 
reason why we cannot find a positive relation between separate CEO and sustainability 
performance. Previous studies point that foreign corporate investors, who possess less 
information than domestic counterparts, may show a greater preference for corporate 
social and environmental performance corporations willing to consider the non-financial 
elements for investees’ businesses to avoid risk from a long-term perspective. Therefore, 
foreign investors who engage in value-enhancing or value-seeking strategies may 
demonstrate a stronger preference for firms that perform well in terms of their 
non-financial outcomes than domestic counterparts. Though there is no significant effect 
of foreign investors on environmental and social scores, the result implies the positive 
relation between foreign ownership and sustainability performance. 
We focus on four corporate governance mechanisms because previous studies 
have identified their potential to contribute to better social and environmental decisions. 
The management literature has shown mixed results in relation to these structures and 
sustainability issues, which represent a need for further analysis. Thus, we undertake an 
investigation and our results contribute to the sustainability management literature by 
showing the influence of corporate governance mechanisms in encouraging 
sustainability performance. From the regression results, we identify some crucial 
implications for managers and policymakers. From a managerial point of view, even our 
regression result shows that an independent director is significant; however, on a 
practical level, we do not know how it can affect sustainability performance. Thus, only 
testing the direct effect of corporate governance mechanisms on sustainability 
performance is not sufficient. When CEOs or top managers are pressured by corporate 
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governance, what type of effective management process (behavior approach) for 
sustainability will they employ is still a black box for us as they have the discretionary 
power to decide the management tools to be adopted into sustainability management 
and exercise these activities. This is the second research question we should answer. 
Merchant and Van der Stede (2012) provide a clue of the management tool that could be 
MCSs, which is inextricably linked with corporate governance because MCSs’ focus 
takes the perspective of top management and asks what can be done to ensure proper 
behaviors of managers and employees in the organization. Meanwhile, the role of 
corporate governance is controlling the behaviors of the top management (the 
executives) and those of all the other employees in the firm. Thus, Merchant and Van 
der Stede (2012) suggest that corporate governance adds to management control of both, 
the concern for controlling the behaviors of top management and the internal 
governance control of the company’s board of directors. Considering corporate 
governance as an influencing factor from the internal point of view, what type of MCS 
mediates corporate governance and corporate sustainability performance? In the next 
chapter, we try to identify the naturalized model to answer the second research question. 
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5. Mediating effect of EMCS between corporate governance and 
environmental sustainability performance 
 
In Chapter 4, we adopted the fixed effect model to examine the direct effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on sustainability performance. Though the results 
reveal the significant role of independent directors, we cannot obtain vigorous evidence 
to prove the role of the other three mechanisms, as predicted. In the literature review, 
the reason for the unstable results is indicated to possibly be due to neglecting the 
mediator between corporate governance and sustainability performance. As explained 
previously, as there is no avouchment that top managers are willing to positively work 
on environmental and social sustainability activities, corporate governance mechanisms 
have the function to control and motivate top managers’ behaviors. The boards can 
monitor and evaluate top mangers’ actions using sustainability performance. This would 
be the motivation for top managers to improve sustainability performance. Therefore, 
the boards encourage top managers to develop proactive and comprehensive 
sustainability strategies to achieve superior environmental and social performance 
(Dubey et al., 2017). For top managers, EMCS are effective instruments to translate 
their behaviors evolving environmental management and achieve organizational goals. 
Hence, we suggest that EMCS has a mediating effect between corporate governance and 
sustainability performance. This chapter aims to explore the mediating effect of EMCS 
and examine our suggestion. 
 
5.1 Corporate governance and EMCS  
 
With respect to the relationship between corporate governance and EMCS, we 
find three studies that describe them and suggest that they are associated with each other. 
Guenther et al. (2016) indicate that several factors may simultaneously drive both 
environmental strategy employed, commonly classified along a continuum from 
reactive to proactive approaches, and another line of inquiry focuses on issues related to 
corporate governance. Though research on the consequences of corporate governance 
mechanisms has a long tradition, scholars have recently begun to specifically explore 
the relationship between corporate governance and environmental performance. Malmi 
and Brown (2008) include corporate governance into MCSs as one of the administrative 
controls because governance includes the formal lines of authority, accountability, as 
well as the systems which are in place to ensure that representatives of the various 
functions and organizational units meet to coordinate their activities both vertically and 
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horizontally (Malmi and Brown, 2008, p.295). As a governance structure can be 
designed in many ways in any given organization, researchers should not group them 
together, but instead study how they are linked with each other and other controls.  
Though we did not find any empirical studies to verify the direct relationship 
between corporate governance and MCSs, as described above, efforts to address 
specific sustainability issues strongly depend on CEOs’ strategic decision-making. As 
corporate governance enables to discipline CEOs’ behaviors, in order to encourage 
CEOs to tackle sustainability issues actively, corporate governance needs to consider 
how can CEOs’ behaviors be controlled. For instance, as specified in 3-1 in “The 
Guidelines for Investor and Company Engagement”14, CEO qualifications are required 
to make decisions decisively to generate sustainable growth and increase corporate 
value over the mid- to long-term. Moreover, 3-4 in the same guideline suggests the 
objective, timely, and transparent procedures to appoint or dismiss CEOs via an 
appropriate evaluation of the company’s business results, that the CEO is not adequately 
fulfilling the CEO’s responsibilities. Consequently, along with the influence of 
corporate governance mechanisms, CEOs are thought to have sufficient motivation to 
improve sustainability performance. In addition, to respond to the request of governance 
and to improve sustainability performance that might lead to CEOs’ own evaluation, the 
use of EMCS can be an effective means for CEOs. If so, corporate governance can 
facilitate CEOs to adopt EMCS. EMCS has the mediating effect to make corporate 
governance mechanisms to improve sustainability performance. Figure 2 shows our 
conceptual model to reflect our suggestion.  
The development of ideas for sustainability management, such as the integration 
of environmental aspects into management controls to translate environmental strategic 
intents into eco-practices, can be found in Arjalies and Mundy (2013), Gond et al. 
(2012), and Pondeville et al. (2013). Scholars have begun to link existing frameworks of 
MCS to a wide range of topics on environmental issues and sustainability. This 
development is driven by speculation that is based on MCS and its role on strategic 
                                                     
14 The Council of Experts Concerning the Follow-up of Japan’s Stewardship Code and Japan’s Corporate 
Governance Code published the proposal “Revision of the Corporate Governance Code and 
Establishment of Guidelines for Investor and Company Engagement” in March, 2018. The Council 
proposed to revise the Corporate Governance Code and establish the Guidelines for Investor and 
Company Engagement that provide agenda items for engagement. In accordance with the proposal stating 
that the Tokyo Stock Exchange would promptly revise the Corporate Governance Code and the Financial 
Services Agency (FSA) would issue the Engagement Guidelines, the FSA called for public comments on 
the Engagement Guidelines. Finally, based on the received comments, the FSA finalized the Engagement 
Guidelines(Financial Services Agency, HP. https://www.fsa.go.jp/en/news/2018/follow-up/20180601.html, 
2018-07-13). 
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coordination, where organizational learning can be adapted to environmental problems. 
Therefore, EMCS promotes effective integration of environmental issues in the process 
of strategy development and strategy implementation; aligns corporate decision-making, 
employee actions, and actions with environmental targets; and identifies new threats and 
opportunities (Gond et al., 2016; Guenther et al., 2016; Lisi, 2015). Gond et al. (2012) 
claim that MCSs enable to integrate environmental issues with organizational practices. 
Guenther et al. (2016) argue that the integration of sustainability in general and 
environmental aspects in particular into MCSs are now being addressed in MCSs 
research. They also claim that the concept of EMCS provides a promising approach for 
integrating the presently fragmented lines of internal drivers and managerial processes 
that may foster firms’ environmental performance and push organizations in the 
direction of sustainability. In their research, they position MCSs as a starting point for 
EMCS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Analytic Model 
 
5.2 Corporate governance, EMCS, and environmental performance 
 
The broadened perspective of MCSs implies that appropriate control can be 
achieved by two distinct control strategies (Ouchi, 1979). Goebel and Weissenberger 
(2017) also emphasize this standpoint and summarize that the two control strategies are 
formal control, such as performance evaluation processes, extensive budgetary controls, 
detailed rules, and standard operating procedures; and informal control. Organizations 
can influence their employees’ behaviors through informal control, such as through the 
selection and training approaches or the design of an integrative corporate culture that 
builds on shared values and beliefs, which are considered as important MCS 
components that affect employees’ perceptions and actions (Goebel and Weissenberger, 
2017, p.189). The informal control mechanisms can promote an understanding of the 
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organizational objectives. Meanwhile, Goebel and Weissenberger (2017) indicate that 
formal and informal control mechanisms do not exist in isolation and it is generally 
acknowledged that companies rely on both means of controls in any setting. According 
to the definition of formal and informal control strategies described by Ouchi (1979), 
the object-of-control (OoC) framework can divide management controls into formal 
(results and action controls) and more informal mechanisms (personnel and cultural 
controls). 
This study builds EMCS on Merchant and Van der Stede’s (2012) framework 
because Simon’s (1995) LoC framework exclusively focuses on formal controls (Tessier 
and Otley, 2012), and Malmi and Brown’s (2008) framework includes too many formal 
and informal control elements, which have the possibility of overlapping categories and 
need to be further developed. Thus, in comparison to other management control 
frameworks, the OoC framework is theoretically well-grounded in a long line of 
empirical research that builds on Ouchi’s (1979) formal and informal classifications 
(Merchant and Otley, 2007). Our first set of hypotheses relates to the effect of EMCS 
employing action control, result control, personnel control, and cultural control. 
In line with the propositions of the relationship among corporate governance 
mechanisms, EMCS, and environmental sustainability performance, we develop our 
hypotheses as follows. As organizations need to ensure that their EMCS contain the 
information required to accomplish the sustainability mission and be an important part 
of their accountability, GRI standards offer a methodology for measuring and disclosing 
information. On the other hand, as GRI standards, including environmental and social 
indicators, are linked to processes and targets, they can periodically monitor MCS 
(Garcia et al., 2016). Furthermore, the finding of Garcia et al. (2016) also suggests the 
potential for GRI standards to support MCS. Thus, we suppose the following: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The adoption of GRI standards leads to the effectiveness of EMCS. 
 
Independent directors may be more responsive than insiders to stakeholder 
pressures concerning sustainability (Post et al., 2015). It can be owing to two reasons. 
First, as Post et al. (2015) indicated, by effectively serving stakeholders’ interests, 
independent directors can enhance their own reputation and support the firm taking 
strategic action that varies from action supported by the CEO because they are not 
employed by the focal firm and have less pressure on financial performance. Their role 
is not only monitoring, but advising as well if independent directors are knowledgeable 
and have diverse backgrounds and experiences. Therefore, independent board members 
37 
 
have more incentive to align stakeholders’ interests and encourage the firm to pursue 
sustainability-themed strategies, such as EMCS. Second, with the publication of Japan’s 
Corporate Governance Code, principles 4.7 15  and 4.8 16  specify the role and 
responsibilities of independent directors to monitor the management through important 
decision-making by the board. Thus, these principles provide sufficient motivation for 
independent directors to monitor or advice managers to adopt EMCS. 
 
Hypothesis 6: A higher proportion of independent directors leads to the effectiveness of 
EMCS. 
 
In a manner similar to the role of independent directors, the separation of CEO and 
chair positions may make the board chair play an important role in monitoring and 
advising CEOs to grasp new ideas and new behaviors related to environmental issues 
(Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al., 2014). This viewpoint is consistent with the proposal of the 
Corporate Governance Code. Principle 4.3 of the Corporate Governance Code supposes 
that the board should view the oversight of management from an independent standpoint. 
This makes us propose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 7: A separate CEO leads to effective EMCS. 
 
In previous studies, ownership is selected as one important variable to corporate 
performance. A majority of these studies focus on the role of foreign ownership. 
Neubaum and Zahra (2006) consider institutions’ investment, including foreigners’ 
investment horizon in relation to corporate social performance. Thus, the results suggest 
that if a firm is exposed to investors with a long-term horizon, they will be concerned 
about sustainability issues. Therefore, though EMCS has no direct association with 
foreign ownership, if foreign ownership pursues long-term benefits, it has the power to 
put pressure on the CEOs to implement EMCS. As such, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
                                                     
15 Principle 4.7 of the Corporate Governance Code emphasizes that “companies should make 
effective use of independent directors, taking into consideration the expectations listed below with 
respect to their roles and responsibilities. In particular, it proposed the provision of advice on 
business policies and business improvement based on their knowledge and experience with the aim 
to promote sustainable corporate growth and increase corporate value over the mid- to long-term”. 
(Japan’s Corporate Governance Code, 2018)  
16 The supplementary of Principle 4.8 states that independent directors should endeavor to exchange 
information and develop a shared awareness among themselves from an independent and objective 
standpoint to contribute to discussions by the board. 
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Hypothesis 8: A higher proportion of foreign ownership leads to effective EMCS. 
 
EMCS can be regarded as a specific application of management control (Henri 
and Journeault, 2010). This paper follows the framework of Merchan and Van der 
Stede’s OoC including four dimensions: action, result, cultural, and personnel. In Henri 
and Journeault (2010), EMCS is indicated to foster environmental performance by 
providing feedback, information for decision-making, organizational attention, and data 
for external reporting. Thus, we suppose the following: 
 
Hypothesis 9: The effectiveness of EMCS leads to better environmental sustainability 
performance. 
 
Based on the conceptual model, to ensure the validity and reliability of the factors 
for the dependent variables EMCS and environmental sustainability performance in the 
model, we first conduct exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and then a secondary factor 
analysis.  
 
5.3 Research method 
 
5.3.1 Data and sampling 
Data for this study was collected from a survey administrated in 2015 on listed 
companies in Tokyo Stock Exchange as part of a joint research project with Dresden 
Technische Universitaet17. We use NIKKEI Needs database to generate our target 
sample. We focus on the listed companies on the first section in Tokyo Stock Exchange 
and exclude financial industry because environmental issues are more likely to represent 
a major concern for them. Finally, we manage our target sample of 1,698 firms. The 
survey was designed by a structured 12-page questionnaire. The questionnaire was sent 
to the head of environmental or sustainability management. The questionnaire was 
extensively pretested and discussed with several academics and practitioners in order to 
check the clarity, understandability, and content validity of the questions in the survey 
interview. Moreover, the questionnaire was translated to English, German, and Japanese 
                                                     
17 This was part of a survey research project, which was conducted by Kobe University and Dresden 
Technische University in Germany. In this project, we sent two questionnaires to each sample 
company (one to the manager of sustainability/CSR department, and the other to financial 
managers/CFOs) in Japan and Germany. 
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languages. Upon revision, we sent a cover letter in January 2015, along with the survey. 
The mailing process was completed in January 2016, resulting in a response rate of 
15.25% (252 responses). Table 5 presents the description of the respondents. 
Concerning non-response bias, different analyses are performed to confirm the 
validity of the data. The comparison between the respondents and non-respondents 
regarding return on sales and ROA reveal no significant differences. In addition, 
non-response bias is also tested by early response and late response. There is no 
significant difference between late and early respondents. Overall, it appears that we do 
not need to be concerned about the non-response bias.  
 
Table 5 Sample description 
 
Panel A: Size 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Industries 
 
 
5.3.2 Measurement of constructs 
In order to test the conceptual model as presented in Figure 3 concerning the 
assessment of EMCS and environmental sustainability performance, we use the 
constructs and items described in the previous EMCS studies. All the items are collected 
as part of reflective constructs on a 7-point Likert scale. Prior to conducting EFA, we 
eliminate all the items, which are checked for the ceiling effect18. Table 6 presents the 
                                                     
18 The term ceiling effect is a measurement limitation that occurs when the highest possible score or 
Industry Description % of sample 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 0.40% 
Construction 7.90% 
Manufacturing 73.60% 
Transportation and public utilities 4.10% 
Wholesale trade 5.80% 
Retail trade 3.30% 
Real estate activities 0.80% 
Accommodation and food service activities 4.10% 
Total 100.00% 
Sales in thousands JPY (n=242) Number of employees (n=242)
Mean 720,007.05 16,489.69
Min 4,571.00 114.00
Max 13,925,339.00 271,789.00
Standard deviation 1,493,348.02 36,333.64
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EFA results and the survey items employed in this paper. Table 7 presents the 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) result of survey items used to measure the main 
constructs. We adopt the same four variables to represent governance as Chapter 4.  
Environmental management control system (EMCS). Four different validated 
categories are used to measure EMCS. For the measurement of EMCS, we integrate the 
general MCS conceptual framework of Merchant and Van der Stede (2012), which 
consists of action, result, cultural, and personnel controls. Additionally, we transfer 
scales used in previous studies to measure the OoC framework on general MCS to the 
specific context of EMCS by adjusting the wording.  
Environmental sustainability performance. Environmental performance is 
measured by perceptual items because a valid and reliable performance assessment that 
does not require objective or subjective measures (Journeault, 2016). Furthermore, 
because the survey data summarize total direct and indirect energy consumption, total 
water withdrawal, total CO2 and CO2 equivalents emission, total amount of waste 
produced, and total amount of hazardous waste produce as environmental sustainability 
performance, this evaluation is more comprehensive. In existing archival databases, as 
some companies lack in environmental performance, using the data from questionnaires 
can avoid this problem.  
Company size measured by the logarithm of sales is used to control for 
economies of scale in the adoption of sustainable management tools. ROA is used to 
control the scale of revenue. To ensure reliability and validity of all items, EFA and CFA 
are conducted. The variables EMCS and environmental performance consist of the 
items from the questionnaire, which are first filtered by EFA. In Table 6, we use 
principal components with promax rotation to extract all factors with an eigenvalue >1.0, 
MSA >0.5, communality >0.5 (Fabrigar et al., 2009), and factor loading >0.5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
close to the highest score on a test or measurement instrument is reached. A ceiling effect can occur 
with questionnaires, standardized tests, or other measurements used in research studies. Therefore, 
whether a large percentage of individuals reach the ceiling on an instrument or whether an individual 
scores very high on an instrument, the researcher has to consider that what has been measured may 
be more of a reflection of parameters of what the instrument is able to measure than how the 
individuals may be functioning (Taylor, 2010, p.133). 
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Table 6 Results of EFA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Action
control
Result
control
Personnel
control
Cultural
control
Environmental
Performance
eco_o1
Superiors monitor necessary steps regarding their subordinates’
achievement of environmental performance goals.
.961
eco_o2
Superiors evaluate the way in which subordinates accomplish
assigned environment-related tasks.
.960
eco_o7
If targeted environmental performance goals are not achieved,
subordinates discuss the next relevant steps with their superiors.
.951
eco_o6
Subordinates discuss the necessary work steps for achieving
their environmental performance goals with their superiors.
.937
eco_o3
Superiors define the most important work steps for
environment-related routine tasks.
.933
eco_o4
Superiors provide subordinates with information on the most
important steps regarding the achievement of environmental
performance goals.
.851
eco_o5
Policies and procedures manuals define the fundamental course
of environmental activities.
.714
eco_p1
Specific environmental performance goals are established for
subordinates.
.945
eco_p2
Subordinates’ achievement of environmental performance goals
is controlled by their respective superiors.
.715
eco_p4
Subordinates receive feedback from their superiors concerning
the extent to which they achieved their environmental
performance goals.
.636
eco_p3
Potential deviations from environmental performance goals have
to be explained by the responsible subordinates.
.557
eco_n2
Much effort has been put into establishing the best-suited
recruiting process for an environmental job position.
.913
eco_n3
Emphasis is placed on hiring the best-suited applicants for an
environmental job position.
.868
eco_n1
Our workforce is carefully selected whether it fits to our firm’s
environmental values and norms.
.781
eco_n6
The environmental goal achievement of our superiors is
carefully regarded when they are promoted.
.752
eco_g6
Our workforce perceives the environment-related values
codified in our mission statement to motivate environmental
initiatives.
.954
eco_g7
Our firm relies on a code of business conduct (e.g., compliance
guidelines) for environmental management to define appropriate
behavior for our workforce.
.833
eco_g5
Our workforce is aware of the firm’s environment-related
values.
.829
eco_g9
Our firm has a system that communicates to our workforce
environ-mental risks that should be avoided.
.651
eco_l3 Total CO2 and CO2 equivalents emissions .915
eco_l1 Total direct and indirect energy consumption .908
eco_l4 Total amount of waste produced .870
eco_l2 Total water withdrawal .857
eco_l5 Total amount of hazardous waste produced .836
Items
42 
 
Table 7 Results of CFA 
 
The detailed contents of the items are presented in Table 7. “a” denotes reference indicators. All 
the factor loadings are significant (p<0.001) and the standardized factor loadings are above 0.60. 
Cronbach’s alpha exceeds the common threshold of 0.70 (Nunnally and Bernstein, 2006). 
Individual item reliability exceeds the common threshold of 0.400 (Bagozzi and Baumgartner, 
1994). Composite reliability measures above the common threshold of 0.60 (Bagozzi and Yi, 
1988). The average variance extracted exceeds the threshold of 0.50 for latent constructs. 
 
5.3.3 Data analysis 
We examine the model by SEM, which can estimate multiple dependent variables, 
the entire model, and offers (Kline, 2016). We use the AMOS 23.0 software program 
with maximum likelihood estimation to analyze the data.  
Furthermore, we use the frequently reported goodness-of-fit indices comparative 
fit index (CFI), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), the 
standardized root mean square (SRMR) as well as the Chi-square divided by the models 
degrees of freedom (CMINDF) to assess the model fit (e.g., Hu and Bentler, 1999; 
Heinicke et al., 2016).  
Item
Theoretical
range
Mean
Standard
deviation
Standardized
regression
weight (λ)
Individual item
reliability
Composite
reliability
Average
variance
extracted
Cronbach's
alpha
Second-order construct: Environmental Management Control System 0.888 0.670 0.967
First-order construct: Action control 0.955*** 0.912 0.969 0.838 0.971
O_1 1-7 5.11 1.66 0.918*** 0.843
O_2 1-7 5.13 1.62 0.909
a 0.827
O_3 1-7 5.08 1.61 0.911*** 0.829
O_4 1-7 5.03 1.61 0.933*** 0.871
O_6 1-7 5.38 1.51 0.894*** 0.799
O_7 1-7 5.41 1.53 0.928*** 0.862
First-order construct: Result control 0.881
a 0.777 0.917 0.736 0.925
P_1 1-7 4.28 1.87 0.744
a 0.553
P_2 1-7 4.72 1.89 0.889*** 0.79
P_3 1-7 4.99 1.82 0.899*** 0.808
P_4 1-7 4.82 1.83 0.891*** 0.794
First-order construct: Cultural control 0.740*** 0.547 0.907 0.712 0.889
G_5 1-7 5.46 1.23 0.950
a 0.902
G_6 1-7 5.38 1.26 0.891*** 0.794
G_7 1-7 5.68 1.36 0.745*** 0.555
G_9 1-7 5.49 1.52 0.772*** 0.596
First-order construct: Personnel control 0.665*** 0.442 0.903 0.702 0.894
N_1 1-7 3.81 1.53 0.803
a 0.646
N_2 1-7 3.51 1.57 0.873*** 0.762
N_3 1-7 3.55 1.69 0.940*** 0.884
N_6 1-7 3.45 1.52 0.719*** 0.517
Fit indicies:
χ²=205.773;  df=122;  P=0.000; RMSEA=0.054; CFI=0.982; NFI=0.956
Note: “a” denotes reference indicators. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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5.4 Results 
 
Figure 3 and Table 8 present the results of the conceptual model in terms of path 
coefficients, standard errors, and goodness-of-fit indices. The recommended thresholds 
are explained previously.  
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Fig. 3 Results for the structural equation model 
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Table 8 Results for the structural equation model 
 
Note: ***Significant at p-value < 0.01 (two-tailed), **Significant at p-value < 0.05 (two-tailed), and 
*Significant at p-value < 0.1 (two-tailed) 
 
5.4.1 Results of the measurement model 
To ensure reliability and validity, EFA is first conducted. CFA is performed for 
each construct of EMCS. In order to test the framework for EMCS, a second-order CFA 
is also conducted. CFA yields standardized loadings greater than 0.50, Cronbach’s alpha 
is from 0.889 to 0.971, composite reliability (CR) is from 0.903 to 0.969, and the 
average variance extracted for each variable is above 0.50. All these indicators show 
that each construct in this model exhibits satisfactory reliability and validity. 
 
5.4.2 Results of the structural model 
In Figure 3 and Table 8, the model shows the results of the relationship between 
four corporate governance mechanisms and environmental sustainability performance 
mediating EMCS. First, a positive and significant relationship is found between GRI 
standards and EMCS (0.192, p<0.01), supporting H5. This finding suggests that GRI 
standards may foster the effective use of EMCS by providing KPI information, focusing 
attention, and supporting decision-making. This further suggests that the explicit norms 
or codes play a critical role in supporting the implementation of EMCS within a firm. 
Second, a positive and significant relationship is also found between separate 
CEOs and EMCS (-0.159; p<0.05). Thus, H7 is supported. The findings suggest that the 
separation of CEOs and chair positions may play a function on monitoring and advisory. 
The board chair may have the power to manage CEOs to embed sustainable behavior 
into firms. 
Hypothesis Estimate S.E. Model-fit indicies
H5 GRI standard → EMCS 0.192 ** 0.201 Accepted CFI: 0.979
H9 EMCS → Env. Perf. 0.222 *** 0.057 Accepted RMSEA: 0.047
GRI standard → Env. Perf. 0.065 0.161 Chi-square = 352.247
H6 Independent directors → EMCS 0.024 0.101 Rejected CFI: 0.983
H9 EMCS → Env. Perf. 0.241 *** 0.057 Accepted RMSEA: 0.042
Independent directors → Env. Perf. -0.024 0.080 Chi-square = 330.283
H7 CEO duality → EMCS -0.159 ** 0.214 Accepted CFI: 0.981
H9 EMCS → Env. Perf. 0.213 *** 0.056 Accepted RMSEA: 0.045
CEO duality → Env. Perf. -0.132 *** 0.168 Chi-square = 341.526
H8 Foreign ownership → EMCS 0.262 ** 0.073 Accepted CFI: 0.978
H9 EMCS → Env. Perf. 0.203 *** 0.057 Accepted RMSEA: 0.048
Foreign ownership → Env. Perf. 0.122 ** 0.060 Chi-square = 358.530
Descriptions of paths
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Third, we find a positive and significant relationship between foreign ownership 
and EMCS. Thus, H8 is supported (0.262; p<0.05). Though in previous studies the 
suggestion is emphasized that foreign ownership with long-term orientation may 
support CEOs to employ EMCS in firms, our findings present a new trend in the current 
age. More foreign ownership reflects pursuing long-term benefits and their pressure 
push CEOs to focus more on sustainability issues. In addition, their pressure makes 
CEOs adjust their strategies to facilitate EMCS.  
Contrary to the expectations, there is no significant relationship between 
independent directors and EMCS, which fails to support H6. Finally, no matter what are 
the GRI standards, independent directors, CEO duality, or foreign ownership, EMCS 
has shown its invariance relationship with environmental performance in the four 
models. Therefore, H9 is completely supported by this study. 
These findings support our assumption by showing how EMCS acts as a mediator 
variable between corporate governance mechanisms and environmental performance. 
 
5.5 Discussion  
 
This chapter examines the ability of EMCS as a process to support corporate 
governance strategies by translating strategic intentions into sustainability practices. It 
contributes to investigating the role of corporate governance mechanisms to promote 
firms to implement EMCS and improve firms’ environmental performance indirectly by 
opening the black box of the relationship among corporate governance, EMCS, and 
performance. In spite of the fact that we cannot identify the role of independent 
directors, the other three corporate governance mechanisms are all illustrated to be able 
to impel CEOs to implement EMCS. The GRI standards represent global best practice 
in sustainability reporting. Thus, it can provide sufficient information to companies. 
Meanwhile, it is also a trusted reference for policy makers and regulators globally. 
Therefore, adopting GRI standards can be regarded as a governance mechanism for 
sustainability activities. If the board can advise CEOs to absorb more information from 
GRI standards, CEOs will be eager to implement EMCS to improve sustainability 
performance because EMCS is an efficient tool in sustainability practice. 
The investigation in this chapter also provides evidence to a current call to 
examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on sustainability issues. This 
study demonstrates that it is necessary to respond to the suggestion of Japan’s Corporate 
Governance Code. Principle 4 of the Corporate Governance Code emphasizes the roles 
and responsibilities of the board. Our findings, such as a separate CEO, support the 
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point that the board should view the effective oversight of the management and 
directors from an independent and objective standpoint, which is indicated in the 
Corporate Governance Code. As the board can evaluate a company’s performance and 
reflect on the evaluation in its assessment of the top management, this also leads to 
CEOs’ motivation to implement EMCS to improve environmental performance.  
Though the Corporate Governance Code and Guidelines for Investor and 
Company Engagement emphasize the importance of independent directors, our result 
does not support our hypothesis. Concerning the role of independent directors, there are 
also mixed results revealed in the literature review. The reason that our result is not 
supported may be owing to the fact that when we observe the role of independent 
directors, we neglect an assumption for the independent directors with the relevant 
working experience or related knowledge. In addition to the role of monitoring, 
independent directors have the responsibility to provide advice. Furthermore, as 
independent directors have no relation with the company, they can independently and 
objectively judge. However, if they have some connection with the company, such as 
family ties or being a representative of a dominant shareholder, such connections raise 
questions and these issues will be explored more elaborately (Tricker, 2009). This could 
be another reason why we cannot obtain any result from the testing model. 
Our results also identify the role of foreign ownership. This result may possibly 
show us the current trend that after the Lehman shock, if more investors are changing to 
consider the long-term horizon, their requirement may be the coexistence of economic 
and environment. Considering this situation, the proportion of foreign ownership may 
put pressure on CEOs to improve sustainability performance. CEOs are willing to 
effectively adopt EMCS. 
Furthermore, by integrating the four categories of MCS supposed by Merchant 
and Van der Stede (2012), this chapter also contributes to highlight the effectiveness of 
EMCS to improve environmental performance. This is an essential implication for 
management practices as it illustrates the potential of EMCS to bridge the gap between 
a board and top managers. As the board has the responsibility to push forward CEOs to 
embed sustainability issues, in order to monitor CEOs’ behaviors, the board may assess 
CEOs’ behaviors by sustainability performance. Thus, our results strongly urge CEOs to 
adopt practices such as EMCS. Overall, based on the results of the analysis, the 
mechanisms of foreign ownership, it is clarified that separate CEO and GRI standards 
can improve sustainability performance through EMCS.  
In previous studies so far, there is no research attempting to adopt the package of 
MCS as a mediating factor. This is considered to be the reason why the verification 
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results may cause instability. Even if corporate governance mechanisms have been 
completed, it became clear that it is possible to demonstrate the function of governance 
more by using EMCS. Owing to the fact that EMCS as a regular control system can 
make environmental activities run, the board ensures that it is being well run and run in 
the right direction. As Tricker (2009) mentioned, boards can ensure that the necessary 
monitoring and control processes are in place. How can top managers’ activities be 
monitored? What is the appropriate control process? According to our results, the 
introduction of EMCS may be one of the choices. Therefore, it was clarified that 
corporate governance and EMCS have a close alliance relationship. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Starting with the formulation of the Corporate Governance Code, governance 
reform in Japan is progressing for listed companies. In the Code, transparent and fair 
decision-making from the stakeholders’ point of view, and clarity concerning 
sustainable growth and mid- to long-term corporate value are stated. However, how to 
practice sustainably is an issue. Economic growth is one perspective that is originally 
the result of efforts by humans to maintain their lives. However, pursuing economic 
growth has caused some other problems, such as environmental destruction. To solve 
these problems, we have to rethink the particular activities of companies, since their 
economic activities may be the cause of environmental problems. There is the 
possibility that top managers prefer to pursue short-term profits and weaken an 
oversight on environmental and social sustainability issues. Therefore, the role of 
governance is important to monitor, advice, and promote the top managers’ behaviors to 
embed environmental sustainability practices into companies’ activities. The purpose of 
this study is to research the interrelationship between corporate governance and 
sustainability performance. To illuminate the impact of corporate governance on 
sustainability performance and investigate the control of sustainability management to 
clarify the practical effect of corporate governance on sustainability performance, this 
paper set two research questions. One is the actual direct effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms on sustainability performance, and the other is to explore the possibility 
that top managers choose EMCS as an efficient tool to promote environmental 
sustainability performance in response to the pressure from corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
To respond to the above research questions, Chapter 2 conducted a literature 
review to observe the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on external and 
internal levels on sustainability performance. By reviewing the articles from 2001 to 
2015, we organized the most relevant mechanisms and their influence on environmental 
and social performance. Aguilera et al. (2015) indicate that corporate governance 
research has primarily focused on internal governance mechanisms. However, much of 
this work ignores the role that external corporate governance mechanisms play in 
preventing managers from engaging in activities detrimental to the firm as a whole. 
When the internal mechanisms fail to play their roles to monitor top managers’ 
behaviors, the external mechanisms are significant to motivate managers to behave 
appropriately. Thus, the external mechanism should also be considered. As described in 
the first chapter of this paper, Financial Services Agency in Japan issued the 
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Stewardship Code in 2014, where companies were called for the development of 
sustainable growth to create value. Considering this background, with the amendment of 
the Corporate Law and Financial Transactions Law, and publishing of the code, the role 
of external mechanisms is emphasized more. Therefore, the review helped to map the 
theoretical model of the whole paper explained in Chapter 3 as well.  
In Chapter 3, to answer the research questions, we first organized the relationship 
among corporate governance, management control, and sustainability performance as a 
research framework and explained the appropriate research method for each research 
question. Since the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on sustainability 
objectives has not started to be discussed in the academic area until recent years, we do 
not have sufficient evidence to identify the real picture of Japanese companies. To fill 
the gap in this study, we first employed Bloomberg ESG database, Nikkei Needs Cges, 
and Toyo Keizai CSR database, which are archival databases used to conduct the fixed 
effect model. Considering the second research question, a questionnaire survey was 
conducted to perceive the real situation of environmental sustainability management in 
companies.  
Chapter 4 examined the possibility of an actual direct effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms on environmental and social performance. In this examination, 
we used panel data from 2012 to 2015 based on Bloomberg ESG database, Nikkei 
Needs Cges, and Toyo Keizai CSR database, and supposed that the codes or norms 
related to measuring sustainability performance, monitoring from independent directors, 
separate CEO, and foreign ownership have a positive relationship with environmental 
and social performance. 
Chapter 5 supposed and investigated the other possibility of adopting EMCS to 
discipline top managers’ behaviors to correspond to the pressure of corporate 
governance. We adopted a part of the results from the survey and merged the archival 
data from Bloomberg ESG database. The results vigorously support our conceptual 
model to provide us with evidence that EMCS has a mediating effect on corporate 
governance and sustainability performance. 
This study explores the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on 
sustainability performance, and the integration of sustainability management within an 
organization’s strategy. Examination of the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and sustainability performance present a weak direct link between 
governance mechanisms and environmental and social sustainability performance. We 
also suggest the mediating effect of EMCS that may make the function of governance 
more or less stable to improve sustainability performance. In doing so, our analyses 
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deliver a twofold contribution.  
First, our results contribute to corporate governance literature. Walls et al. (2012) 
indicated that in understanding how corporate governance mechanisms may influence 
sustainability performance, fragmented and contradictory empirical evidence make the 
findings equivocal. We conducted the empirical analysis to examine the direct 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and sustainability performance. 
The results we obtained from the analysis is relatively weak and similar to previous 
studies. Further, we identify the mediating effect of EMCS between corporate 
governance and sustainability performance. The results hint at one possible reason why 
other empirical studies’ results are contradictory and equivocal because we neglect the 
role of mediating effects of management control. In formulating a strategy, the board 
works with the top management. The board needs to monitor and supervise the activities 
of the executive management, looking inwards at the current managerial situation and 
recent performance (Tricker, 2009, p.46). The board motivates CEOs to introduce 
environmental management control into organizations—not environmental performance 
directly. Moreover, the Cadbury Report (1992) also provides a comment that the 
responsibilities of the board are to set the strategy aims, provide leadership to put them 
in effect, supervise the management, and report to the shareholders on their stewardship. 
This comment could also be applied to the sustainability context. Hence, based on our 
empirical evidence, the elements of governance that should be taken into account to 
deliver the sustainability strategy and the effectiveness of corporate governance in the 
implementation of environmental management control have been identified. 
Second, our results contribute to the EMCS literature. The results of the second 
research question suggest that EMCS may be a useful control process to maximize the 
effective function of corporate governance and discipline environmental sustainability 
management autonomously. Thus far, several articles state that MCS is linked to 
corporate governance. However, all the discussions are limited to the conceptual level. 
The conceptual model in our study first provides the empirical evidence to show that 
EMCS influences the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in enhancing 
environmental performance. Furthermore, our investigation could be consolidated in 
future works by identifying more contingency factors to use and integrate EMCS. 
Finally, our conceptual model to examine the mediating effect of EMCS has 
strong managerial and theoretical implications. First, our analysis reveals that in 
uncovering the form of EMCS integration, the function of corporate governance 
mechanisms may not be sufficient to deploy sustainability performance. It suggests that 
even though companies complete their corporate governance mechanisms if, without the 
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implementation of EMCS, without governance mechanisms, it is challenging to 
maximize their function on sustainability performance. Essentially, the duty of corporate 
governance is to primarily monitor CEOs and supervise the activities of the executive 
management, but not directly to improve performance. We highlight that corporate 
governance can enable improving sustainability performance through the use of EMCS. 
Second, our analysis suggests that only depending on top managers to mobilize 
the strategy of EMCS may not be powerful enough. Our test model stresses that 
corporate governance is the antecedent condition to enhance sustainability strategy and 
it considers a useful approach for top managers who are willing to enhance the level of 
sustainable organizational development by the regular control system, such as EMCS. 
Although our analysis did not consider all the possible organizational contingencies, our 
approach suggests that the implementation of EMCS can support corporate governance 
to play a two-tier role, including monitoring responsible for performance and 
supervisory responsibilities for conformance. 
Third, in addition to managerial implications, our study also implies the 
possibility of a new direction of theoretical approach. The dominant paradigms in 
corporate governance research, such as agency theory, have shown their shortcoming in 
explaining why sustainability targets should be included in corporate strategic goals 
(Walls et al., 2012). Though we did not discuss theory building in the study, the 
examination of the conceptual model indicates that the CEOs’ behavioral orientation 
plays a critical role in embedding sustainability issues. Therefore, the behavioral 
process theory of social psychology, such as stewardship theory and network analysis, 
may be needed to supplement and investigate studies of corporate governance and 
environmental performance link in future research.  
From an empirical viewpoint, our study is also subject to several limitations that 
call for several developments. First, we rely on the data from employees in CSR or 
sustainability department and information regarding the EMCS is not publicly available. 
Hence, our results may be associated with commonly mentioned shortcomings of 
questionnaire-based survey studies such as Goebel and Weissenberger (2017). More 
specifically, concerning environmental performance, as we employ the evaluation of 
environmental performance from individual respondents’ cognition, the assessment of 
environmental performance may include subjectivity and social desirability. Thus, 
perfecting the objective of the data represents an area for future research. 
Another limitation relates to our findings regarding the EMCS. In this study, we 
address the overall control style based on the organizational level and use secondary 
factor analysis to constitute the assessment of EMCS. Further research can investigate 
52 
 
the role of different aspects of the OoC framework, including action, result, cultural, 
and personnel controls that have not been investigated, but should be a matter for 
further analysis. In addition, the control measures for environmental management could 
also be divided into formal and informal controls in specific contingencies (Goebel and 
Weissenberger, 2017). Therefore, analyzing the effects of alternative control 
mechanisms may be an additional insight. Despite these potential limitations, we 
believe that our findings provide significant insight for the academic world and practice, 
and respond to the calls for an effective management system to communicate corporate 
governance related to sustainability issues and improve sustainability performance.  
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Appendix: Summary of empirical studies on corporate governance in CSR contexts 
Journal  Author Data Focus of study Key findings 
Business 
Strategy and  
the Environment  
Amran et al. 
(2014) 
113 companies from 12 
countries in the Asia-Pacific 
region 
The influence of corporate 
structure and strategic CSR 
toward sustainability reporting 
quality 
Sustainability reporting quality (SRQ) in the region 
leaves much room for improvement. The 
institutionalization of the concept of CSR in an 
organization provides a sound foundation for 
enhancing SRQ. 
Business and 
Society  
Ayuso et al. 
(2014) 
2004 annual review for the Dow 
Jones Sustainability Indexes 
(DJSI) by SAM Group, 946 
firms from 31 countries and 18 
different market sectors 
Stakeholder approach to 
corporate governance 
The traditional distinction between 
shareholder-centered and stakeholder-centered 
corporate governance systems also has importance in 
CSR strategy. 
Journal of 
Business Ethics  
Chan et al. (2014) 222 annual reports of companies 
traded on the ASX in 2004 
Corporate governance quality 
and CSR disclosures 
The findings of this research support a link between 
corporate governance quality and CSR disclosure in 
company annual reports, and regulators who focus on 
corporate governance quality as a way of increasing 
CSR disclosures may be better served. 
Corporate 
Governance: An 
International 
Review  
Choi et al. (2013) Seven-year data from 2002 to 
2008 of 2055 non-financial 
firms 
The relationship between 
financial transparency and 
CSR activities is affected by 
ownership structure or not 
The relationship is weaker for chaebol firms and firms 
with highly concentrated ownership. The adverse use 
of CSR is discouraged if the fraction of shares owned 
by institutional investors is high. However, no 
evidence is found for a similar moderating effect for 
foreign investors. 
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Corporate 
Governance: An 
International 
Review  
Dam and 
Scholtens (2012) 
600 European firms from 16 
countries and 35 industries in 
2005 
How different types of owners 
affect CSR 
Ownership by employees, individuals, and firms is 
associated with relatively poor corporate social 
policies of the firms they invest in. In contrast, the 
holdings by banks and institutional investors as well as 
those by the state appear to be neutral in this respect. 
Journal of 
Business Ethics  
Fabrizi et al. 
(2014) 
597 US firms over the period 
2005–2009 
CEO’s personal incentives in 
driving CSR 
Both monetary and non-monetary incentives have an 
effect on CSR decisions. More specifically, monetary 
incentives designed to align CEOs’ and shareholders’ 
interests have a negative effect on CSR and 
non-monetary incentives have a positive effect on 
CSR. 
Management 
Decision  
García-Benau et 
al. (2013) 
127 listed companies in Spain 
for 6 years, financial 
information data from the 
DataStream database 
The financial crisis has had an 
impact on CSR reports and the 
assurance of these reports 
The number of CSR reports increased significantly 
post-crisis. No significant impact was found regarding 
the changes in assurance strategy. 
Journal of 
Business Ethics  
Jizi et al. (2014) Large US commercial banks for 
the period 2009-2011 
The role of board directors 
influence the quality of CSR 
disclosure in US commercial 
banks’ annual reports. 
With regard to CSR disclosure, more independent 
boards and larger boards promote both shareholders’ 
and other stakeholders’ interests. CEO duality also 
positively impacts CSR disclosure. 
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Journal of 
Business Ethics  
Jo and Harjoto 
(2012) 
Kinder, Lydenberg, and 
Domini’s (KLD’s) Stats 
database includes more than 
3000 companies containing 
various CSR characteristics 
The effect of corporate 
governance on corporate 
responsibility 
While the lag of CSR does not affect corporate 
governance variables, the lag of CG variables 
positively affects firms’ CSR engagement after 
controlling for various firm characteristics. CSR 
engagement positively influences corporate financial 
performance, supporting the conflict-resolution 
hypothesis based on stakeholder theory. Firms’ CSR 
engagement with the community, environment, 
diversity, and employees plays a significantly positive 
role in enhancing corporate financial performance. 
Journal of 
Business Ethics  
Khan et al. (2013) 135 manufacturing companies 
listed on the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange in Bangladesh from 
2005–2009 
The relationship between 
corporate governance and the 
extent of CSR disclosure in 
annual reports of Bangladeshi 
companies 
Although CSR disclosures generally have a negative 
association with managerial ownership, such a 
relationship becomes significant and positive for 
export-oriented industries. Public ownership, foreign 
ownership, board independence, and the presence of an 
audit committee have positive significant impacts on 
CSR disclosure. Overall, corporate governance 
attributes play a vital role in ensuring organizational 
legitimacy through CSR disclosures. 
Management 
Decision  
Kuo and Chen 
(2013) 
208 firms listed on the Japan 
Nikkei Stock Index 500 
The relationship between the 
level of environmental 
disclosure and establishment 
of a legitimacy image of 
Firms from environmentally-sensitive industries can 
significantly improve their perceived legitimacy by 
releasing CSR reports; firms with better prior 
environmental legitimacy will be more active in 
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operation among Japanese 
firms after the implementation 
of the Kyoto Protocol 
environmental disclosure and establish better 
environmental legitimacy in the next period; firms with 
better carbon reduction performance tend to have 
higher levels of environmental disclosure. 
Corporate 
Governance: An 
International 
Review  
Ntim and 
Soobaroyen 
(2013) 
291 non-financial firms listed on 
the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange over the period 2002–
2009 from five main industries 
The relationship between 
corporate governance and CSR 
Better-governed corporations tend to pursue a more 
socially responsible agenda through increased CSR 
practices. Furthermore, a combination of CSR and 
corporate governance practices has a strong positive 
effect on corporate financial performance than CSR 
alone. 
Quality and 
Quantity  
Sharif and Rashid 
(2014) 
Annual reports of 22 
commercial banks listed on the 
KSE 100 index from 2005–2010 
To explore Pakistani listed 
commercial banks, CSR 
reporting information along 
with the probable effects of 
different corporate governance 
elements on CSR disclosures 
Even though reporting of CSR is voluntary in Pakistan, 
the participation of Pakistani commercial banks in 
different CSR activities is not low. The level of CSR 
activities performed by the banks is impressive. 
Non-executive directors have a positive impact on the 
CSR reporting supporting stewardship theory in 
commercial banks of Pakistan. 
Journal of 
Business Ethics  
Zhang et al. 
(2013) 
500 of the largest companies 
listed on the U.S. stock 
exchanges spanning 64 different 
industries 
The effects of board 
composition on CSR 
performance  
Greater presence of outside and women directors is 
linked to better CSR performance considering a firm’s 
industry. 
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Management 
Decision  
Cormier et al. 
(2011) 
137 firms that undertook web 
disclosure in 2005. Sample firms 
represent more than 80% of the 
Toronto Stock Exchange’s 
capitalization for non-financial 
firms and 46% of the total 
capitalization  
Social disclosure and 
environmental disclosure have 
a substituting or 
complementing effect in 
reducing information 
asymmetry between managers 
and stock market participants 
A firm’s governance influences the extent of its CSR 
disclosure and affects information asymmetry between 
a firm’s managers and other stakeholders. 
Journal of 
Business Ethics  
Godos-Díez et al. 
(2011) 
149 completed questionnaires to 
the CEOs of 2,987 companies in 
2008 in Spain 
A relationship between 
manager profile and CSR 
practices, and that this relation 
is mediated by the perceived 
role of ethics and social 
responsibility 
Those closer to the steward model are more inclined to 
attaché great importance to ethics and social response, 
and to implement CSR practices in their companies. 
Journal of 
Business Ethics  
Harjoto and Jo 
(2011) 
12,527 firm-year (2,952 firms) 
observations from 1993 to 2004 
The relationship among CSR, 
governance, and firm 
performance 
Consistent with the conflict-resolution hypothesis, 
CSR choice is positively associated with governance 
characteristics, including board independence and 
institutional ownership. CSR engagement positively 
influences operating performance and firm value, and a 
weak support of the product-signaling hypothesis is a 
major motive for CSR engagement. 
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Journal of 
Business Ethics  
Jo and Harjoto 
(2011) 
12,527 firm-year (2,952 firms), 
including both CSR and 
non-CSR firms during 1993–
2004. 
The effects of internal and 
external corporate governance 
and monitoring mechanisms 
on the choice of CSR 
engagement and the value of 
firms engaging in CSR 
activities 
CSR choice is positively associated with internal and 
external corporate governance and monitoring 
mechanisms. The impact of analysts following firms 
that engage in CSR on firm value is strongly positive, 
while board leadership, board independence, and 
institutional ownership play a relatively weaker role in 
enhancing firm value. 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
and 
Environmental 
Management  
Kolk and Pinkse 
(2010) 
CSR reporting of Fortune 
Global 250 companies 
To what extent has corporate 
governance become integrated 
in multinational enterprises’ 
(MNEs’) disclosure practices 
on CSR 
More than half of the samples have a separate 
corporate governance section in their CSR report. 
MNEs that disclose information on a wider variety of 
social and environmental issues, and frame CSR with a 
focus on internal issues are more inclined to integrate 
corporate governance into their CSR reporting. 
Accounting and 
Business 
Research  
Mallin and 
Michelon (2011) 
Business Ethics 100 Best 
Corporate Citizens over the 
period 2005–2007. Data 
collected from the KLD’s 
SOCRATES database. 
The relationship between 
board reputation and corporate 
social performance 
The proportions of independent, community 
influential, and female directors are positively 
associated with corporate social performance, while 
the presence of a CSR committee is positively 
associated with community performance. However, 
CEO duality and community influential directors with 
multiple directorships have a negative effect on 
corporate social performance. 
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Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
and 
Environmental 
Management  
Prado-Lorenzo et 
al. (2009) 
116 non-financial Spanish firms 
quoted on the Spanish 
continuous market 
The effect that shareholder 
power and dispersed 
ownership structure have on 
the decision to disclose CSR 
information in the Spanish 
context 
The increasing value that society is placing on the 
socially responsible behavior of organizations in 
economic, social, and environmental terms, and the 
legal requirements for this type of behavior and its 
reporting to the society have become essential factors 
leading firms to begin to disclose information on CSR 
that has been verified and can be compared 
internationally. 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
and 
Environmental 
Management  
Sánchez et al. 
(2011) 
125 companies listed on the 
Spanish Continuous Stock 
Market 
The relationship between 
corporate governance and 
corporate social behavior 
A firm’s social sensibility of corporate governance can 
be measured through the independence and pluralism 
of boards and ownership power. There is a direct 
relationship between a firm’s social sensibility of 
corporate governance and its social behavior. 
 
